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Wireless memories are the new trend in memory technology and a result of the
latest advances in wireless and data transfer technologies. Allowing transfer of large
amounts of data between a host device (e.g., a computer, a mobile phone) and a
battery-free wireless memory is essentially the goal of these devices. The advent of
this class of memories has opened up the door to a wide range of applications for
storing and sharing contents in a wireless manner. Most of the applications of a
wireless memory system require a secure transfer of the data between the two sides.
In this thesis, means to provide the required security for the wireless memory system
is studied, implemented and demonstrated.
This thesis ﬁrst studies some of the common security threats and the correspond-
ing mechanisms to protect the communication of sensitive data from these threats.
Additionally, it analyses some of the threats that are most probable in case of the
communication between a wireless memory tag and a host device. Then, the secu-
rity architecture implemented on the wireless memory's tag side to secure the tag's
life-cycle is reviewed. This architecture is implemented based on the limited pro-
cessing power available in the memory which is due to the fact that the memory tag
is wirelessly powered by the host. It is also assumed that more complex mechanisms
should be employed in the host side of the system.
The introduced security architecture was implemented using a Cyclone II FPGA
board and the employed mechanisms were tested using a Linux machine as the host
device. The implemented mechanisms guarantee conﬁdentiality and integrity of the
wireless channel between the two side of the communication as well as authentica-
tion, access control and secure life-cycle management of the wireless memory.
The number of clock cycles that diﬀerent security operations need to be performed
and the size of the security software were measured using the prototype hardware and
synthesis tools conﬁrm the feasibility of the implementation on the actual memory
tag. In the future, when more processing capabilities are available on the memory
tag, the wireless memory features may be expanded.
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TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Security attack Any action that compromises the security of information owned
by an entity is called a security attack[35].
Security mechanism A process (or a device incorporating such a process) that is
designed to detect, prevent, or recover from a security attack[35].
Plaintext Plaintext is the original intelligible input message or data that is
fed into the encryption algorithm[35].
Ciphertext Ciphertext is the scrambled message generated as the output of
encryption. Ciphertext depends on the plaintext and the encryption
key. The ciphertext is a random stream of data and, as it stands, is
unintelligible.[35]
Bob and Alice Generally, Alice and Bob are the parties communicating using a
non-secure channel. These names were used by Ron Rivest in the
1978 Communications of the ACM article presenting the RSA cryp-
tosystem, and in A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and
Public-Key Cryptosystems published April 4, 1977, revised Septem-
ber 1, 1977 as technical Memo LCS/TM82.[15]
Mallory Mallory is the malicious attacker in the communication.
One-way function One-way function is deﬁned as a function in which given an
argument value x, it is easy to compute the function value f(x) ,
whereas it is intractable to compute x from f(x)[33].
Trapdoor one-way function Trapdoor one-way function is a one-way function
f : X → Y with the additional property that given some extra in-
formation (called the trapdoor information) it becomes feasible to
ﬁnd for any given y ∈ Im(f), an x ∈ X such that f(x) = y[24].
A Feistel cipher A feistel cipher is an iterated cipher mapping a 2t-bit plain text
(L0, R0), for t-bit blocks L0 and R0, to a ciphertext (Rr, Lr), through
IX
an r-round process where r ≥ 1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ r , round i maps
(Li−1, Ri−1)→ (Li, Ri) as follows:
Li = Ri−1, Ri = Li−1 ⊕ f(Ri−1, Ki)
where each sub-key Ki is derived from the cipher key K.[24]
ICv49 UMETAG ICv4 is one of the integrated circuits designed in the ﬁrst
phase of UMETAG project which integrates the memory interface
(SPI) and a base band digital block. ICv49 is the next generation
of the UMETAG circuits. ICv49 evaluates features such as NFC
remote powering and reader, and device-to-device functionalities.
SPI SPI is a general purpose synchronous serial interface created by
Motorola. Using an SPI interface, transmit and receive data can
be serially shifted in or out simultaneously. SPI interface can be
used for communications with another serial peripheral device or a
micro-controller with an SPI interface.[7]
UART The UART performs serial-to-parallel conversions on data received
from a peripheral device and parallel-to-serial conversion on data
received from the CPU[17].
11. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Wireless Memory Trend and Fundamentals
The very latest advances in data transfer technology has led to the advent of wireless
memories. Wireless memory technology introduces multiple alternatives for storing
and sharing contents in a wireless manner. Integration of wireless technology with
the major group of the products nowadays brings out a variety of applications for
wireless memories. Many use cases can be based on the ability of wirelessly transfer-
ring contents from/to a mobile device especially at high speeds and capacities[40].
Promising fast and large data transfers using battery-free wireless memories pro-
posed by this generation of storage devices oﬀers a wide variety of potential appli-
cations[8].
A wireless memory system consists of a high capacity non-volatile storage device
and a memory subsystem embedded in a mobile device. The former is addressed as
the "tag" and is often a battery-free device. The latter, on the other hand, is called
a host and is a battery powered system embedded in another device. A Tag device is
initially composed of an RF unit and a memory while a host device is comprised of
an application processor, an RF unit and a memory. The wireless memory system is
meant to be used basically for transferring data between the host and the tag within
short proximity. The basic elements of a wireless memory system are as follows:
Radio The RF unit employs ultra-wide band technology which enables achieving
high data rates but in near proximity according to the power restrictions made by
the Federal Communications Commission. The ultra-wide band technology oper-
ating at 7.9 GHz center frequency enables data rates up to 108 Mb/s. The tag
device is designed to be wirelessly powered by the host device which is provided by
implementing a super-regenerative architecture in the tag device's RF unit.
Memory Various non-volatile memory technologies may be adopted in the wireless
memory system on the condition that they satisfy the required high data rates,
high storage capacity, low power consumption and long life span. Some candidates
studied are NAND/NOR ﬂashes and phase change memory.
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Processing A processing unit is required at both sides to handle, control and
respond properly to the commands which is, as a result, responsible for running the
software required for the security too. On the tag side ( the target of this thesis),
a ﬁnite state machine implemented in the tag's circuit holds the responsibilities of
communicating with the host based on the commands received.
1.2 Security
Information security is deﬁned as the protection aﬀorded to a system in order to
attain the applicable objectives of preserving the integrity, availability, and conﬁ-
dentiality of the information system resources[14]. This deﬁnition highlights three
key aspects of security: ﬁrst, conﬁdentiality which includes data conﬁdentiality and
privacy, second, integrity which consists of both data and system integrity and last
availability. This triad embodies the vital objectives of security for a system[35].
However, some feel that some additional concepts are needed to ensure a completely
secure system. Two other commonly mentioned are authenticity and accountabil-
ity[35].
Conﬁdentiality basically means preserving authorized access and disclosure of
information[16]. Integrity aims for protecting information from abnormal modiﬁca-
tions or total destructions. Availability ensures proper access for the users of the
system. Authenticity is gaining trust and the knowledge of genuineness of the diﬀer-
ent parties involved in the communication. Accountability is the ability of tracing
an entity's actions to that entity uniquely[35].
Some threats that may endanger preserving the aforementioned concepts can be
listed as:
• Eavesdropping
• Impersonation
• Man-In-The-Middle
• Skimming
• Jamming
• Denial of service
To prevent or lower the risks of such attacks, some mechanisms have been intro-
duced. These mechanism are mainly categorized into two groups of symmetric key
and public key schemes as well some other hybrid schemes based on the two ﬁrst
categories.
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• Symmetric key encryption: Symmetric key encryption consists of ﬁve ingre-
dients: plaintext, encryption algorithm, secret key, ciphertext and decryption
algorithm.[35] The basic idea in symmetric key encryption is that same key is
used for both encryption and decryption. A symmetric key algorithm trans-
forms the plaintext into a ciphertext using the secret key and the encryption
algorithm and on the other side using the same key and a decryption algorithm,
the plaintext can be retrieved from the ciphertext.[35]
• Public key encryption: In public key encryption (also known as asymmetric
encryption) a party processes a pair of keys (as opposed to one secret key
in symmetric encryption) : a public key and an associated secret key [2]. A
party's public key can be publicly known. Asymmetric encryption transforms
plaintext into ciphertext using one of the two keys and an encryption algo-
rithm. On the other side, the plaintext can be retrieved using the paired
key and an encryption algorithm[35]. Public key encryption can be used for
conﬁdentiality, authentication, or both.
1.3 This Thesis
One of the very essential aspects that most of the applications of the wireless memory
systems rely on is the degree of access control and security provided when transfer-
ring information. Moreover, the increasing number of cyber security threats along
with the wide range of applications for the wireless memory system strengthens the
urge for equipping these devices with security mechanisms
Wireless memory security means wireless memory access control, authentication
and secure life-cycle management, as well as the conﬁdentiality and integrity of the
wireless channel between the host and the wireless memory.
The goal of this thesis is to enable the wireless memory system to maintain
conﬁdentiality, integrity and authentication when exchanging information between
tag and the host. In this thesis, the possible threats that may endanger the security
of the wireless memory tag are discussed and means to protect the tag from these
potential attacks are introduced.
This thesis highlight some ways to add the required security support in wireless
memory tag, based on conditional access to parts of the wireless memory. This means
that "read"s and "write"s to some memory parts would be only possible in a certain
manner or would be restricted by speciﬁc PINs. The access control mechanisms that
will be described basically prevent "reads" by unintended parties and accidental, or
malicious "overwrite"s of user's data stored on the wireless memory.
The aforementioned access control is achieved by organizing the available memory
capacity to diﬀerent segments, each segment conﬁgured to respond to the commands
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from the reader in a speciﬁc manner. As a result, there will be three main areas in
the memory: an area to hold the data for diﬀerent segment's conﬁguration, some
access controlled segments and a public area to be used for insensitive information
transfer. Precise memory layout and details on the behaviour of access controlled
segments are discussed later in section 5.1.
When designing the security architecture for the memory tag, it should be taken
to account that the memory can only take advantage of a limited processing capa-
bility. Additionally, as the tag is powered by the host device, it has to be considered
that only consuming extremely low power is acceptable. Consequently, it is assumed
that the master host (the "reader") implements standard cryptographic functions
such as the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), while the wireless memory sup-
ports only the security functions requiring low processing capability.
1.3.1 The Prototype
During the development of the wireless memory system, all communications between
the host and the tag are wired. The memory is connected to a board equipped with a
Cyclone II FPGA, regulators, connectors and converters. This board along with the
memory is basically operating as the tag side in the system while a Linux machine
is responsible for the operations done by the host. On the host side, the PC is con-
nected to the board using a USB cable which is converted to the UART afterwards.
Then it is connected to the UART port of the Cyclone II FPGA board where the
Nios II processor, as mentioned earlier, will be responsible for the processing tasks.
Using the SPI bus, the Cyclone II FPGA is connected to the non-volatile memory.
In this mode of operation, the tag system (including the FPGA and the Nios II
processor) is directly powered by the regulators on the board and thus no super
regenerative architecture is needed.
1.3.2 Structure
This thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 discusses some of the well known security threats, how they attempt
to gain access to information, the cases in which a certain security attack may be
successful and some examples of each type of the threats. This discussion is followed
by introducing some mechanisms commonly used to provide information security.
These mechanisms are represented with mathematical expressions and details on
how they work are described.
Chapter 3 addresses some of the suitable memory technologies for the wireless
memory system and their advantages and disadvantages. Furthermore, a compar-
ison on latency, speed and density is done between the addressed technologies. In
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addition to memory technologies, the wireless technology employed for the wireless
memory system is studied. This section explains how the super-regenerative archi-
tecture is employed to enable the memory tag to operate, being powered by the
host. It is also clariﬁed how the ultra-wide band technology allows transferring data
with high data rates.
Chapter 4 explains the hardware and software architecture of both the tag and the
host side. The hardware section addresses the basic elements of the wireless memory
system: radio, memory and processing. Following the hardware, the software section
depicts an abstract view of the software architecture and how the security software
is positioned in the overall software architecture of the tag. It is also clariﬁed how
the architecture changes during the development of the project when the connection
between the two sides is wired and a PC is used to replicate the actions of the host
side.
Chapter 5 ﬁrst analyses some of the threats introduced in Chapter 2 and looks
at them in the context of the communications between the two sides of a wireless
memory system. It also studies how the information exchange between the tag
and the host can be endangered in diﬀerent types of security attacks. Secondly,
it is explained how the security and access control techniques are implemented in
the tag side of the system. Furthermore, the memory tag's organization, layout and
operations are clariﬁed. This section includes detailed demonstration of the diﬀerent
elements of the security architecture.
Chapter 6 studies the security mechanisms implemented in this project. It deﬁnes
how these mechanisms are integrated to the memory's architecture and how they
can prevent the possible threats that endanger the memory's security. Additionally,
some measurement results obtained from the software tools on the timing, code size
and area of the implemented architecture are presented. Furthermore, a few test
cases for some of the access control and security operations are provided.
Finally, in the conclusion chapter, the suggested mechanisms, their importance
and strengths in protecting the memory from attacks are summarized. It is summed
up how with the available resources in an stand-alone powerless tag device, adequate
security is obtained. Some recommendations for future research are also provided
at the end.
62. SECURITY THREATS AND MECHANISMS
This chapter addresses some common security threats and how they can access
sensitive data and endanger the security of a system. Furthermore, some mechanisms
that can help lower the risks of such threats are introduced.
2.1 Security Threats
Wireless devices are prone to many security threats as a result of the nature of the
wireless medium. Over the air communications can be overheard by any receiver in
the transmission range of the sender.
2.1.1 Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping is referred to the act of listening to the communication between (the
tag and a genuine reader) by an adversary. Eavesdropping is usually done with
the goal of achieving data that can be used by the adversary to pretend to be an
authorized reader[39]. So the information will not be changed in favour of the eaves-
dropper but it remains intact, however, it can be used for impersonation. Depending
on the network topology and the communication standard eavesdropping may be
simple or diﬃcult. While eavesdropping on a wired communication is relatively
diﬃcult(due to lack of physical access to the medium), eavesdropping on a wire-
less communication can be greatly easier. Data captured by eavesdropping can be
useful if unencrypted, or encrypted using known encryption method. Data with an
unknown encryption is without any value for the eavesdropper.
2.1.2 Impersonation
The adversary's actions aiming to represent himself as another user is referred to as
impersonation. If Mallory successfully deceives Alice into believing that she is com-
municating with Bob while actually she is exchanging the information with Mallory,
She is impersonating Bob.Therefore, besides consistency, impersonation undermines
a range of security goals such as authentication, authorization, non-repudiation,
accountability, and possibly data integrity and conﬁdentiality. Impersonation of-
ten requires to forge authentication data or to send messages with forged source
addresses. A special case of impersonation attack is Man-In-The-Middle attack
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presented below.[13]
2.1.3 Man-In-The-Middle
"Man In The Middle" security threat occurs when a two party communication is
intercepted by a third party without letting the two main parties know. The man
in the middle will use the information and alter it for his own purposes. The man
in the middle should be placed in the network path between the two parties ( as
shown in Figure 2.1 ) so that it can delay,modify or drop packets[3].
Figure 2.1. Man-In-The-Middle attack
Imagine Alice and Bob as the two sides of the communication and Mallory as the
Man In The Middle. Let's say Alice needs Bob to send his bank account information
to her. Alice sends her public key in a message to Bob so that Bob can encrypt
his bank account information with her key. Mallory reads the message and alters
it into his own public key and remembers Alice's. Then Bob encrypts his bank
information with Mallory's public key, thinking that it is Alice's and then sends it
to Alice. Mallory receives the message decrypt it with his own key and therefore
has Bob's bank information. Mallory encrypts an irrelevant number with Alice's
key and sends it to Alice. Alice decrypts it with her own key assuming that it she
will get Bob's info. So the Man in the middle attack compromises the public key
cryptography.
2.1.4 Skimming
Authorization is the operation used to prove that the reader touching the wireless
device is genuine and the upcoming communications with the reader can be trusted
in that sense. The security threat caused when an adversary starts a communication
with the tag without any authorization is known as "skimming". Skimming attacks
are mostly known by credit card skimmings. credit card skimming can be done
using devices that read all the digital content on a magnetic stripe of a credit or
debit card.[12]
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2.1.5 Jamming
Radio communications are subject to "jamming" which basically means transmitting
unwanted radio signals on the communication channel "intentionally" to decrease
the signal to noise ratio(SNR) of the received signal. Received signal with SNR value
less than 1 ( which basically means having bigger noise value in comparison with
the signal value) indicates a successful jamming attack[31]. Spot jamming, sweep
jamming, barrage jamming and deceptive jamming are among the existing jamming
methods[27].
2.1.6 Denial of Service
Denial of service attacks are based on wasting all the available resources from the
victim which leaves the victim without means to provide services for the eligible
hosts. This type of attacks usually aim for hosts providing a type of service and
thus by disrupting the services, the reliability of the victims are targeted. Denial-
of-service attacks come in a variety of forms and aim at a variety of services. There
are three basic types of attack:[34]
• consumption of scarce, limited, or non-renewable resources
• destruction or alteration of conﬁguration information
• physical destruction or alteration of network components
2.2 Security Mechanisms
Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques related to aspects of informa-
tion security such as conﬁdentiality, data integrity, entity authentication, and data
origin authentication. Cryptography is not the only means of providing information
security, but rather one set of techniques. Cryptography is about the prevention
and detection of cheating and other malicious activities.[24]
Cryptographic schemes are basically divided into two main groups: symmetric
key, public key. Additionally, there are some hybrid schemes commonly applied
today using both symmetric key and public key algorithms relying on the advantages
and avoiding disadvantages of both schemes.
• Symmetric key encryption
A symmetric key encryption, also called single-key, one-key, private key, and
conventional encryption, is deﬁned as follows.[24]
Consider an encryption scheme consisting of the sets of encryption and de-
cryption transformations
E = {Ee : e ∈ K}
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and
D = {Dd : d ∈ K} ,
respectively, (where K is the key space). The encryption scheme is said to
be symmetric-key if for each associated encryption/ decryption key pair (e,
d), it is computationally "easy" to determine d knowing only e, and to deter-
mine e from d. d and e being equal in most practical matter makes the term
"symmetric" appropriate.
Symmetric key encryption is usually described as a safe box with a strong key.
Anyone with the key can send and receive messages safely using the box.
Consider a communication between Bob and Alice where an unknown third
party can hear the communication channel between them and the data needs
to be hidden from him. Alice encrypts her message using Bob's key so that
Bob can decrypt the message using the same key and access the contents of
the message. The eavesdropper cannot understand the message and the data
is safe. This case can be useful only assuming that there is a secure channel
for Bob to send his key to Alice without the eavesdropper hearing it.
Disadvantages of the symmetric key encryption :
 Need for a secure channel for the key transmission.
 Need for having various keys in a network where each communicating
pair needs a diﬀerent key.
• Public Key encryption
A public key encryption is deﬁned as follows.[24]
Let
E = {Ee : e ∈ K}
be a set of encryption transformations, and let
D = {Dd : d ∈ K}
be the set of corresponding decryption transformations, where K is the key
space. Consider any pair of associated encryption/decryption transformations
(Ee,Dd) and suppose that each pair has the property that knowing Ee it is
computationally infeasible, given a random cipher-text c ∈ C, to ﬁnd the
message m ∈ M such that Ee(m) = c. This property implies that given e,
it is infeasible to determine the corresponding decryption key d. (Of course e
and d are simply means to describe the encryption and decryption functions,
respectively.) Ee is being viewed here as a trapdoor one-way function with d
2. Security Threats and Mechanisms 10
being the trapdoor information necessary to compute the inverse function and
hence allow decryption. This is unlike symmetric-key ciphers where e and d
are essentially the same. The encryption key e is called the public key and can
be transmitted over an unsecure channel, while the decryption key d is called
the private and is kept safe with the receiver.
In the safe box example the public key cryptography can be described as a safe
box that can only be opened by the receiver. If the receiver let the lock open,
anyone can deposit in the box, however, only the receiver can understand the
messages. Even the sender cannot retrieve the message, in case he erases it
after depositing.
Mechanism using the public key encryption:
1. Establishment protocols (e.g., Diﬃ-Hellman key exchange)
2. Digital signature algorithms (e.g., RSA, DSA or ECDSA)
3. Encryption
Disadvantages of the public key encryption :
Computations used for public key transmissions are much more demanding
than the symmetric key encryption algorithms.
2.2.1 Block Cipher
Block ciphers divide the plaintext message into blocks of equal length over an al-
phabet and does the encryption one block at a time. [24] This means that the
encryption of any plaintext bit in a given block depends on every other plaintext bit
in the same block.
Figure 2.2. Block Cipher
As it can be seen in Figure 2.2, the encryption function ek() is used for all blocks
x1, x2, ..., xb to obtain:
y1, y2, ..., yb = ek(x1), ek(x2), ..., ek(xb).
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The encryption function ek needs to be a one to one function to enable unique
decryption. As a fundamental building block, the block ciphers' versatility allows
construction of pseudo-random number generators, stream ciphers, MACs, and hash
functions.[24] They provide conﬁdentiality and are used as a basic and prominent
element in many cryptographic applications.
Majority of block ciphers use 128 bit (16 Byte) or 64 bit (8 Byte) blocks. An
example of the former is Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Data Encryption
Standard (DES) for the latter.
The data encryption standard(DES)
Although nowadays, DES is not considered secure againts a determined attacker
because of its small key space[29] and is on the way out, it is still used in legacy
applications. The eﬀective secret key length for DES is 56 bits and it uses block-
length of 64 bits and it consists of 16 rounds of what is called a "Feistel network".[2]
Looking at Figure 2.3, it can be understood that the DES algorithm consists of three
major phases. First of which is the Initial permutation (IP) which rearranges bits to
produce the permuted input.[35] Then the permuted input goes through 16 rounds of
the same function which involves both permutation and substitution functions. The
result from these 16 rounds is a 64 bit output which is a function of both the secret
key and the plaintext input. Then a 32 bit swap is done to generate the pre-output.
In the third and last phase, the pre-output goes through the inverse permutation
(IP−1) that was used in the ﬁrst phase to produce the 64 bit ciphertext output.
The right-hand part of Figure 2.3 shows how the 56 bit key is used. First the
key is passed through a permutation function. Then using a left circular shift and a
permutation a sub key is generated for each of the 16 rounds. The initial permutation
(IP ) is deﬁned in table 2.1.
IP
58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2
60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4
62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6
64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8
57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1
59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3
61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5
63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7
Table 2.1. Initial permutation (IP )
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Figure 2.3. General description of DES encryption algorithm
The advanced encryption standard(AES)
AES is a block cipher and a successor to DES. Unlike DES, AES uses 128 bit block
size and a key size of 128, 192, or 256 bits. Instead of Feistel network structure,
AES encrypts all 128 bits in one iteration and as a result it has a comparably small
number of rounds.[28] Each full round consists of four separate functions: byte
substitution, permutation, arithmetic operations over a ﬁnite ﬁeld and XOR with
a key.[35] AES contains N rounds, and the number of rounds needed depends on
the length of the key. Each round uses the four transformation functions except
for the ﬁnal round which only contains of three transformation functions. There is
also a single transformation before the ﬁrst round. Each 128 bit block of input is
considered as 4 ∗ 4 square matrix of bytes. Each transformation takes in one 4 ∗ 4
matrix as input and produces a 4 ∗ 4 output. The details of AES cipher encryption
and decryption are illustrated in Figure 2.4.
TEA, XTEA and XXTEA
Tiny encryption algorithm(TEA) is a block cipher operating on 64 bit blocks and
using 128-bit key. TEA is fast and simple and has a very small size. Its security
weaknesses are having equivalent keys, related-key and slide attacks[30]. Having
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Figure 2.4. AES encryption and decryption
equivalent keys reduces the eﬀective key size to 126 bits. XTEA (eXtended TEA)
is an extension of TEA which corrects some of the weaknesses of original TEA.[43]
XTEA has a more complex key schedule, and XXTEA (corrected block TEA) which
is explained in more details.
XXTEA is a block cipher designed by Roger Needham and David Wheeler of
the Cambridge Computer Laboratory. Formally speaking, XXTEA is a consistent
incomplete source-heavy heterogeneous UFN (unbalanced Feistel network).[1] It op-
erates on a block consisting of at least two 32-bit words, using a 128-bit key. The
block can be viewed as a circular array. A single XXTEA full cycle consists of
looping through the block words, adding to each word a function of its immediate
neighbours, full cycle number and the key; a single XXTEA round for a ﬁxed block
length can be concisely described as: [42]
vr ← vr + F (vr−1, vr−1, r, k)
A full cycle is n rounds, where n is the number of words in the block. The number
of full cycles to perform over the block is given as 6 + 52/n.[42]
One round of XXTEA is shown in Figure 2.5
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Figure 2.5. One round of XXTEA
An attack published in 2010 by E. Yarrkov presents a chosen plaintext attack
against full-round XXTEA, requiring 259 queries and negligible work.[42]
2.2.2 Stream Cipher
Using time-varying encryption transformation functions, stream cipher encrypts the
plaintext message bit by bit.
Figure 2.6. Stream Cipher
As it can be observed from Figure 2.6, for each single bit x1, x2, ..., xb diﬀerent
encryption function are used to obtain:
y1, y2, ..., yb = ez1(x1), ez2(x2), ..., ezb(xb).
where z1, z1, ..., zb is the key stream.[28]
This is achieved by adding a bit from a key stream to a plaintext bit. There
are synchronous stream ciphers where the key stream depends only on the key, and
asynchronous ones where the key stream also depends on the ciphertext. [29]
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In comparison with block ciphers, stream ciphers are faster and smaller and thus
suitable for applications with little computational resources like in cell phones. A
prominent example for a stream cipher is the A5/1 cipher, which is part of the GSM
mobile phone standard and is used for voice encryption.
2.2.3 Digital Signature
The idea for a digital signature is basically extracted from the conventional way of
signing on a paper. Digital signatures bind the identity of an entity to a particular
message or piece of information.[23]. What digital signatures bring to the table in
the security ﬁeld is not privacy or secrecy. Digital signatures provide the integrity
of the message and veriﬁcation of the person who has written the message.
To achieve a better understanding of digital signatures, let's study the subject
using the example of the communication between Bob Alice who share a secret key
which is used for encryption with a block cipher. Assuming that only Bob and Alice
know the key, the communication can be considered reasonably safe in the sense that
a third party has not changed the message. However, is the attack always initiated
by a third party? Can the two parties always trust each other?Are the symmetric
schemes suﬃcient to secure the two sides of the communication from each other?
Bob sends Alice a message saying that he is going to meet her at 6 o'clock. Bob
encrypts this message using their shared secret key and sends it to Alice. However,
he forgets to meet her. Being dishonest, Bob claims that he never sent her such
message. Without a signature of Bob at the end of message, there is no way to
prove his dishonesty. This example is rather simple but in practice there are many
cases that there is a need to prove the fact that a speciﬁc person has created a
certain message. This is where digital signatures come in handy. Bob signs the
message x with his private key kpr :
y = signkpr(x)
Bob sends (y, x) to Alice. Alice runs the veriﬁcation function verkpub(x, y) with
Bob's public key.
As it is shown in Figure 2.7, the signature should be both a function of the private
key and the message. It is a function of the private key so that only the holder of
the key can sign it. To make sure that it changes with every message, it should be
a function of the message.
Properties of digital signatures:[28]
• Only Bob can sign his document (with the private key kpr).
• Everyone can verify the signature (with the public key kpub).
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Figure 2.7. A digital signature
• Authentication: Alice is sure that Bob signed the message.
• Integrity: Message x cannot be altered since that would be detected through
veriﬁcation.
• Non-repudiation: The receiver of the message can prove that the sender had
actually send the message.
Lamport Signature
The ﬁrst hash based scheme is Lamport's one time signature scheme. To sign mes-
sage of length k the system is set up as follows:[38]
Let H be a one way function
H : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k.
The signer chooses 2k random strings x1[0], x1[1], ..., xk[0], xk[1] and stores them as
his secret key X. Then he computes
yi[b] = H(xi[b])
for b ∈ {0, 1} and 1 ≤ i ≤ k. The public key is the vector
Y = (y1[0], y1[1], ..., yk[0], yk[1])
of 2k strings of length k each. The signature S(X,m) of a message m is x1[m1], ..., xk[mk]
where m = (m1, ...,mk). The veriﬁer checks whether H(xi[mi]) = yi[mi] for 1 ≤ i ≤
k.
The scheme is called one-time signature because a public key can be used only
for one signature: if a second message is signed that diﬀers from the ﬁrst in at least
two hash bits, then an attacker can generate further valid signatures. Assume that
the ﬁrst message satisﬁes m1 = (0, 1, 1, ...) and the second message satisﬁes m2 =
(1, 1, 0, ...). Then x1[0], x1[1], x2[1], x3[0], x3[1], ... are revealed, allowing anybody to
sign also messages (1, 1, 1, ...) or (0, 1, 0, ..), where the values in the dots need to
match one of the previously signed messages.
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2.2.4 Hash Functions
When it comes to very long messages, digital signatures do not seem to be as eﬃcient.
For the aim of performance and security, it is preferred to have signatures of the same
length for messages with diﬀerent lengths. The solution lies in the hands of hash
functions. Hash functions use the plaintext message as input and produce an output
referred to as a message digest, ﬁngerprint of the message, hash code, hash-result,
hash-value, or simply hash.[24] The output is a short, ﬁxed length string.
Requirements for hash function h:[28]
• Hash function h(x) should be relatively easy to compute
• It should be a one-way function. For almost any given output z, it is impossible
to compute input x such that h(x) = z.
• Given x and consequently h(x), it must be impossible to ﬁnd x′ such that
h(x) = h(x′).
• For the hash function h, it should be impossible to ﬁnd any two pairs (x, x′)
such that h(x) = h(x′).
Unlike other cryptographic algorithms introduced, hash functions usually do not
use keys. There are deﬁnitions of hash functions available where a secret key is
fed to the hash function as well as the input message itself. However, this is not
the common case. Based on these deﬁnitions, hash functions can be split into two
groups:[24]
• Unkeyed hash functions
• Keyed hash functions
Hash functions are mainly for digital signature schemes and message authenti-
cation codes. Figure 2.8 shows the basic protocol of hash functions used in digital
signatures.[29]
Bob wants to send a signed message to Alice. Bob ﬁrst calculates the hash value
z of message x using the hash function h(x).
z = h(x)
Then he signs the hash value z using his private key Kpr,B and produces s.
s = signkpr,B(z)
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Figure 2.8. Hash functions and digital signatures
Note that the hash value z has a ﬁxed length, resulting in signature s to be of a
ﬁxed length as well.
On the other side, Alice computes the hash value z′.
z′ = h(x)
She can verify Bob's signature s with Bob's public key Kpub,B.
verKpub,B(s, z′) = true/false
2.2.5 Authentication
Authentication is the technique used by one of the communicating parties to verify
the identity of the other party. This technique is used to prevent impersonation
attacked described in the previous chapter. This is mostly done by checking the
correctness and integrity of the message using a secret associated by design with
the genuine party.[24] Most commonly used message authentication is a message
authentication code( MAC), also known as a keyed hash function.[35].
Figure 2.9. Principle of message authentication codes
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Principle of MACs generation and veriﬁcation is shown in Figure 2.9.
A MAC is a function of symmetric key k and message x, thus we have:[29]
m =MACk(x)
The produced MAC m can be transmitted with the protected message x to the
other party. The integrity of the message can be checked by producing the MAC
value of the message and comparing it with the transmitted one. An adversary
wanting to alter the message cannot produce the right MAC value without knowing
the secret key. The only parties in possession of the secret key can produce the
appropriate MACs.
First Bob computes m = MACk(x) and sends the message x together with the
code m to Alice. Then Alice calculates y′ =MACk(x), compares y with y′ and thus
veriﬁes the integrity of the message. Note that Alice calculates the MAC exactly
the same way Bob does.
As it can be observed, MACs have some common properties with digital sig-
natures. They both provide message authentication and integrity, however, un-
like digital signatures, message authentication codes are symmetric key schemes
both for creating authentication code and for verifying it; and do not provide non-
repudiation.[29] MACs are much faster than digital signatures and are based on hash
functions or symmetric ciphers.
MACs from block hash functions: HMAC
The basic idea for the HMACs is to hash a secret key k with message x and consider
the hash output as the authenticating tag for the message:
m = HMACk(x) = h(k||x)
and:
HMACk(x) = h[(k
+ ⊕ opad)||h[(k+ ⊕ opad)||x]]
where the symbol "||" denotes concatenation, k+ is k padded with zeros on the left
so that the result is b bits in length ( where b is the number of bits in a block), ipad
is 00110110 repeated b/8 times and ipod is 01011010 repeated b/8 times.
MACs from block ciphers: CBC-MAC
An alternative method for using hash functions in MAC generation is to construct
MACs using block ciphers. The most common approach is to use a block cipher
such as AES in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode.
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3. MEMORY AND WIRELESS TECHNOLOGY
This chapter shortly reviews some suitable memory technologies to be used in the
wireless memory system and compares them in terms of speed, capacity and energy
consumption. Then in the next section, the employed wireless technology in the
system is thoroughly discussed.
3.1 Memory Technologies
Various memory technologies can be taken into account when selecting an appro-
priate memory to be used in the wireless memory tag. The ability to maintain
information after being powered down (non-volatile memory) is the ﬁrst criteria to
be met by the chosen memory technology. Moreover, another critical matter that
has to be considered is the power consumption of the memory, as the target of the
tag design is to be powered through wireless power transfer. Other important issues
to look at include capacity, speed and life span of the diﬀerent memory technologies.
Two applicable technologies are NAND/NOR ﬂash and PCM.
3.1.1 Flash Memory Technology
Flash memories are a powerful and cost-eﬀective non-volatile memory that was es-
sentially developed from EEPROM (electrically erasable programmable read-only
memory). These memories are characterized by the fact that the erasing operation
should be performed at the same time on a sector or block of memory in contrast
to being done cell by cell. This brings the advantage of having a competitive size
for ﬂash memories.[25] Flash memories are categorized into two dominant forms
depending on the way the cells are organized: NAND and NOR ﬂash devices.
NOR ﬂash
The internal architecture of the NOR ﬂash is such that the individual memory cells
are connected in parallel. As a result, the memory achieves random access and thus
short read times. This ability introduces nor ﬂash as an ideal technology for low
density, high speed read applications.[10] NOR ﬂash has been typically used for code
storage and direct execution in portable electronics devices.[10]
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NAND ﬂash
NAND ﬂashes were developed to compensate for the low density and size of the
NOR ﬂash memories. IN NAND ﬂashes random access is given up in trade-oﬀ
with size. The small cell size of NAND chips results in lower cost per bit. NAND
ﬂashes achieve fast writes and erases with programming groups of data by utilizing
their high density and small cell size. While an erase operation is straight forward
in NAND technology, in NOR technology all bytes need to be written with zeros
before being erased. Moreover writes to ﬂash devices can only be performed only if
the device has been erased before. The two previous properties result in the faster
performance of NAND devices in write and erase operations.[37] Regarding the life
span of the two types of the ﬂash memories NAND ﬂashes oﬀer up to ten times
the life span of NOR devices. NAND ﬂash is an ideal technology for low cost, high
density, high speed applications.
3.1.2 Phase-change Memory (PCM)
Phase change memory is an emerging non-volatile technology exploiting the property
of chalcogenide glass. PCM is a dense technology and each PCM cell can store
more than one bit. PCM oﬀers signiﬁcantly better read access time in comparison
with NAND technology but has slightly lower write speed.[32] In comparison with
NAND/NOR ﬂash memories, phase-change memory oﬀers longer life span. PCM
technology is less eﬃcient than NAND technology when the memory is accessed as
relatively large blocks. NAND Flash array program/read currents for state of the
art Single-Level Cell (SLC) devices are typically in the range of 25 to 50 mA, while
PCM array program currents for state of the art devices are typically in the range
of 50 to 70 mA and array read currents in the range of 30 to 50 mA. [20]
Table 3.1 derived from [32] shows the diﬀerences between the three technologies:
NOR ﬂash, NAND ﬂash and PCM.
Parameter DRAM NAND Flash NOR ﬂash PCM
Density 1X 5X 0.25X 2X-4X
Read Latency 60 ns 25 us 300 ns 200-300 ns
Write Speed 1 Gbps 2.4 MB/s 0.5 MB/s 100 MB/s
Table 3.1. Comparison between memory technologies
3.2 Wireless Technology
The most important concepts in the wireless technology employed in the wireless
memory system are the ultra-wide band radio communication technology and the
super regenerative architecture which are reviewed shortly below.
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The RF unit in the tag employs a I-UWB 7.9 GHz communication and a simple
On-Oﬀ-Keying (OOK) modulation. The maximum achievable data rate in this
architecture will be 108.48 Mb/s.
3.2.1 Ultra-wideband Technology
UWB technology is loosely deﬁned as any wireless transmission scheme that occupies
a bandwidth of more than 25% of the center frequency, or more than 1.5GHz.[11]
As it can be easily inferred from its name, UWB uses an extremely wide band of
RF spectrum which consequently enables it to achieve much higher data rates than
the more traditional technologies.
In 2002, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States
essentially unleashed huge "new bandwidth" (3.6 - 10.1 GHz) at the noise ﬂoor.
UWB radios can use frequencies from 3.1 GHZ to 10.6 GHz, a more than 7 GHz
wide band[6][41]. Each radio channel can have more than 500MHz of bandwidth
in accordance with its center frequency. FCC has made severe transmit power
restrictions which enables UWB to make use of such wide frequency band while not
interfering with nearby devices using narrower band such as 802.11a/b/g radios. As
a result UWB devices can obtain very high data throughput but only over short
distances. Using UWB technology allows reuse of the spectrum meaning that a
group of devices can communicate on the same channel used by another group of
devices e.g. in another room.
3.2.2 Super-regenerative Architecture
Why super-regenerative receiver and ultra-wideband technology
Super-regenerative receivers were most commonly used in narrowband communica-
tions over the last decade. The main reason was the extremely low power consump-
tion obtained with the new technologies. While the lack of frequency selectivity
was a major drawback in narrowband communications, it is used as an advantage
in ultra wideband communications[21]. Additionally super-regeneration relies on an
unstable circuit which enables huge RF gain with extremely low power consump-
tion which is a great condition for the power and gain trade-oﬀ in ultra wideband
communication systems. Above all, super-regenerative architecture is sensitive to
time domain energy concentration which is speciﬁcally proper for the ultra wide-
band impulse signals since these signals concentrate all the useful energy in short
time duration. In contrast to conventional impulse UWB transceivers there is no
need for multipath recovery over the distances below 30 cm. This decreases the
requirements set for the UWB transceivers. This is used to minimize complexity
and power consumption of the transceivers.[18]
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Super-regenerative architecture for impulse UWB receivers
As shown in Figure 3.1, the core of the receiver is a super-regenerative oscillator,
an RF oscillator that can be modeled as a frequency selective network or resonant
circuit whose output is fed back through a variable gain ampliﬁer[26]. The low
Figure 3.1. Block diagram of a basic super-regenerative receiver
frequency quench generator or the quench oscillator is responsible for controlling
the damping factor of the oscillator with a speciﬁc command called the quench
signal which controls growth and the cut oﬀ of the oscillation[22]. The quench
signal drives the oscillator between stable and unstable states. In short, a super-
regenerator uses the transient response of an oscillator to ﬁlter and amplify the
signal[21]. The principle of super-regenerative architecture in pulsed communication
Figure 3.2. principle of super-regenerative architecture in pulsed communication
is illustrated in Figure 3.2. When the detector receives energy from the input vi(t),
the quench signal is triggered synchronously. As a result, the damping factor ζ(t)
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becomes negative. The super-regenerative samples the input signal at this time and
starts oscillating. The time it takes the oscillation to start depends on the amount
of the energy received from the input. When the quench signal is switched oﬀ,
the detector switches to the stable mode and consequently the damping factor ζ(t)
becomes positive. The oscillator is damped until the next phase for input signal
sampling. After each quenching, RF oscillation grows exponentially, starting from
the tiny energy picked-up by the antenna plus circuit noise. Starting from noise,
the amplitude of the resulting self oscillation does not exceed the detection level
in the ﬁrst quench period before damping of the signal by the inactivation of the
quench signal at t = ta. When the input signal is large enough within the sensitivity
period of the receiver, the oscillation grows faster and reaches the detection level at
tb shown in Figure 3.2.[21]
Super-regenerative architecture in the reader-tag communication
Figure 3.3 shows the basic super-regenerative principle applied in the reader tag
communication. As it can be seen from Figure 3.3a the reader transmits an ultra
wideband impulse to the tag. The signal pulse will arrive at the tag antenna af-
ter a Time Of Flight (TOF). The signal received by the tag is attenuated due to
propagation loss (Figure 3.3b).
In order for the oscillation to start growing, the signal should arrive on the tag
side in the receiver's sensitivity period, i.e. when the damping factor is negative
and a quench signal is applied to the tag oscillator (Figure 3.3c). After Tq seconds,
i.e. the super-regenerative period, the quench signal is deactivated and the damping
factor becomes positive so the oscillation stops growing (Figure 3.3d and 3.3e).
Precise optimizations are needed between the activation of the quench signal and
the reception of the incoming pulse so that in tsync when the damping factor of the
oscillator becomes negative, the peak value of the incoming pulse would be received
(Figure 3.3b and 3.3d). In case exact synchronization is not done, the oscillation
will start due to noise. However, the amplitude of the regenerated pulse will not be
large enough to be detectable.
On the contrary, if the quench signal and the incoming pulse are well synchro-
nised, the regenerated impulse on the tag side will be detectable(Figure 3.3e). The
amplitude of the impulse will be compared to a pre-deﬁned threshold voltage in
order to produce the information sent from the reader side at the tag side. Fur-
thermore, the pulse could be sent back to the reader as an acknowledgement signal
if direct connection between the tag antenna and the oscillator is obtained (Figure
3.3g).
One of the main issues in impulse ultra-wideband systems is synchronization
which is due to low duty cycle and pseudo random timing of pulsed signals, and
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Figure 3.3. Overview of super-regenerative principle in a reader to tag communication
link
frequency drift and diﬀerences of reference clocks between transceivers[19]. In the
reader tag communication, frequency synchronization is solved using the mutual
narrow band signal.
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4. WIRELESS MEMORY SYSTEM: DEPLOYED
SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE
This chapter studies the hardware and software architecture of the wireless memory
system both on the tag and the host side but more extensively on the tag side which
is the target of this project.
4.1 Memory Tag and Host Hardware Architecture
The functional speciﬁcation of the wireless memory system allows it to operate in
diﬀerent operating modes, i.e. standalone mode (or tag mode), reader mode, peer
mode or in development mode. On the tag side, system may function in either
standalone or development mode.
Regardless of the operating mode, wireless memory system is primarily composed
of two basic sides: The tag side and the host side. The tag side is basically a high
capacity memory device (without battery) while the host side is a wireless memory
subsystem (Reader/Writer) embedded in a battery powered device such as a mobile
phone. The overall architecture of both sides is shortly illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1. Overall hardware architecture of the wireless memory system
4.1.1 Tag Architecture
As illustrated in Figure 4.1 the tag side consists of two essential parts: Radio front-
end and Non-Volatile Memory Tag.
Radio front-end : As extensively explained in Chapter 3.2, the radio unit uses a
basic super regenerative transceiver and the communication is done over an impulse
UWB link at 7.9 GHz centre frequency. The overall architecture of the RF module
is optimized for high data rates with low power consumption within short proximity.
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The used data rate is scalable and up to 108Mb/s can be achieved. Synchronization
between the two sides is done using the mutual narrowband signal which is also used
as the reference clock.
Memory : Various Non-volatile memory technologies may be used in the tag or
the host device. The most important criteria to take into consideration would be
providing as high capacity and data rate as possible while consuming as low power as
possible. Additionally, deploying a memory with a long life cycle and high number
of read/write operations is of great importance. The design can take advantage of
technologies like PCM, NAND/NOR ﬂash, DRAM, etc.
As this project was based on the system operation in development mode, the
architecture of the design diﬀers from the overall architecture to some extent. Most
importantly in development mode, the communication between the host and the tag
is wired. A Linux machine is used as the host which communicates with the board
( equipped with a cyclone II FPGA, regulators, connectors and converters) which
the Non-Volatile Memory is also connected to physically. The overall view of the
system's hardware architecture designed for development mode is shown in Figure
4.2.
Figure 4.2. Wireless memory system in development mode
As shown in Figure 4.2, the host PC is connected to the board via a USB cable
and then converted to UART. Then it is connected to Cyclone II FPGA chip's
UART port. The Altera Cyclone II FPGA chip is equipped with a Nios II processor
which handles all the control and decoding of the commands received from the host
and generates appropriate responses.
However, when used in standalone mode, the tag may only take advantage of
a ﬁnite state machine implemented on the tag to decode the diﬀerent commands
transmitted from the reader over the air.
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On the other hand, the Nios II processor used in the development phase is basi-
cally responsible of running the FSM on the tag. However, in the target design the
tasks of the ﬁnite state machine could be executed by just hardware which results
in lower costs in terms of power and area.
While in stand-alone mode, the required power for the tag is provided wirelessly
using the super-regenerative architecture, in development mode, the regulator on
the board will feed the demanded power to diﬀerent elements such as FPGA and
NVM memory. When operating in development mode, the memory is connected to
the FPGA chip via an SPI bus. In this case, the memory obtains its required power
from the regulators and as a result, higher capacity memory prototypes can be used
which cannot be otherwise powered through wireless power transfer.
4.1.2 Host Architecture
In addition to memory and radio unit, the host side also has a processing unit since
a great part of the processes concerning the wireless memory system are done in
the host device. The host is the initiator and responsible for most of the commu-
nication commands and decisions. Speciﬁcally in case of security mechanisms, the
host implements the standard cryptographic functions while the tag only carries out
security functions implementable within its limited processing power.
Unlike the tag, the host is embedded in another device like a mobile phone and
thus it is battery powered. This allows the host to employ the more processing
demanding tasks.
In the development mode of operation, host is a Linux machine sending all the
command and controlling the communication. As it can be seen from Figure 4.2,
the commands are sent to the tag device using a USB cable.
The host architecture will not be extensively discussed in this thesis since it was
not the target of this project.
4.2 Memory Tag and Host Software Architecture
As in the hardware architecture of the wireless memory system, the software ar-
chitecture also diﬀers when operating in diﬀerent modes e.g stand-alone mode and
development mode. Figure 4.3 shows the overall architecture of both the tag and
the host side when used in stand-alone mode.
As stated earlier in the hardware architecture chapter (chapter 4.1), the imple-
mentation of the wireless memory tag in the development mode uses the processor
from the Cyclone II FPGA to decode, handle and control all the received com-
mands. Cyclone II FPGA devices support the Nios II embedded processor that
allows custom-ﬁt processing solutions.
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Figure 4.3. Overall software architecture of the wireless memory system
There are three diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the Nios II processor available: fast,
standard and economy. This design uses the Nios II fast core which is designed
for fast performance. As a result, this core presents the most conﬁguration options
allowing to ﬁne tune the processor for performance.[5]
Nios II's fast core performance at 100 MHz is estimated to be up to 101 DMIPS
(Dhrystone MIPS). It uses about 1400-1800 logic elements. The processor is conﬁg-
ured to utilize 4 Kbytes of instruction cache and 2 Kbytes of data cache with line
size of 32 Bytes in this project. The Debug module uses level 2 debugging i.e. JTAG
target connection, download software, software breakpoints, 2 hardware breakpoints
and 2 data triggers and uses 800-900 logical elements.
The processor and the FPGA run on a 100 MHz clock which is generated from a
50 MHz crystal by the FPGA's internal PLL.
The Nios II processor uses two interfaces:
1. SPI(Serial Peripheral Interface): The SPI interface connects the Nios II
processor to the non-volatile memory. SPI runs at 1 MHz clock and this speed
is due to the slow EEPROM used during the development of this project. The
V49 IC is capable of 100 MHz SPI speed if a suitable memory chip is used.
2. UART(Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter): The UART
interface connects the Nios II processor to the PC which operates as the host
during the development of the project. The UART emulates SPI interface that
is used on the V49 IC and can be directly replaced with a SPI interface. The
UART runs at 115200 Hz.
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4.2.1 Security Software Architecture
The security functionality is located in the middle of the NVM_IF in the tag device
during the development of the wireless memory security. The location of the security
software in the overall tag software can be observed in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4. Position of the wireless memory's security software in development mode
However in the ﬁnal design of the wireless memory (not during development),
The security software would be located on the v49 IC before the NVM_IF which
can be seen in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5. Position of the wireless memory's security software in the ﬁnal implementa-
tion
With the reception of each command from the UART interface from the PC which
acts as the host, it is parsed into a code, address and data. The ﬁrst 8 bits i.e the
code indicates what operation is expected to be done in the memory. The next 24
bits indicate an address in the memory and following that is the data to be written
to the memory or zeros in case of a read command. The security software on the
processor decides based on the code and the address which functions or operations
needs to be done in the wireless memory.
Detecting the "write" code, the program decides based on the address the next set
of operations which can be authentication, PIN/name/ID operations, PIN transfer
or normal operation regarding "read"s or "write"s to a segment which may itself be
in a speciﬁc life-cycle model. If the address belongs to the group of addresses used
for registers, then actions are taken accordingly for the PINs, authentication, name
and ID operations. However, in case the address belongs to the access controlled
area of the memory, then the conﬁgurations of that segment are checked in the
management area in order to take proper following steps.
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The overall structure can be viewed in a UML diagram in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6. The security function in a UML diagram
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5. THREAT ANALYSIS AND SECURITY
ARCHITECTURE
Threat analysis explains how potential adversaries exploit system weaknesses to
attack the system [36]. Furthermore, threat analysis determines possible threats and
distinguishes mechanisms to decrease or completely remove the risk of attacks in a
speciﬁc architecture. Possible security threats are extensively discussed in chapter
2 at general level. In this chapter, some of these threats are looked at and analysed
in the context of the wireless communication between the tag and the host device.
Following the threat analysis, the implemented security architecture for the wireless
memory is explained.
5.1 Threat Analysis for a Security Memory
The information exchanged between the tag and the host device can be eavesdropped
by an adversary to be used for impersonation attacks i.e the eavesdropper listens
to the communication between the two sides and can later take advantage of the
information achieved by eavesdropping. This information can be also used to imitate
the operations of either a genuine host or a genuine tag. Information acquired by
eavesdropping attacks are only useful for the attacker if the exchanged information is
unencrypted. As an example an attacker may listen to the communication between
a host and a tag when a host is transferring PINs to the tag to obtain access to the
memory and later use the PIN to attain access to the tag. This can be prevented
by encrypting the sensitive information moved between the two parties.
Impersonation happens when a malicious attacker imitates one of the parties in
the tag-host communication to be able to access the information in the memory. One
case can be e.g. a fake tag impersonating a genuine one and requesting PINs from a
genuine host to obtain access to PIN protected parts of the memory. If the host lacks
a technique to verify the genuineness of the wireless memory, it may simply disclose
PINs to any requesting tag. To prevent impersonation attacks, an authentication
technique must be employed in the wireless memory's security architecture. Man-
In-The-Middle attacks are, as stated in chapter 2, a special case of impersonation
attacks.
Denial of service threats aim to use up most of the system's available resources
and leave the system with no or limited means to provide services. An example case
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of denial of service attack that may occur in the tag-host communication can be
randomly changing PINs when transferring PINs from host to the tag for accessing
the protected areas in the tag. This section addresses the wireless memory's
organization, layout and operations implemented in relation to the security of the
wireless memory. The memory organization section describes how the memory is
divided into diﬀerent segments. The layout section explains in details the diﬀerent
sections layout and their purpose. The wireless memory operation section deﬁnes
the control and security operations related to the wireless memory.
5.2 Wireless Memory Organization
Wireless memory security means wireless memory access control, authentication
and secure life-cycle management, as well as the conﬁdentiality and integrity of
the wireless channel between the host and the wireless memory. To handle access
control and other security operations on the memory, the memory is organized into
diﬀerent segments or areas. This segmentation of the memory area may diﬀer from
one memory to another and the information regarding these conﬁgurations is stored
in the master area of the respective card. The overall layout of the card can be
deﬁned as follows:
Memory is logically divided into segments of equal size i.e in this project 4KB (
4096 Bytes) each. Some of these segments are reserved for management purposes.
These segments are deﬁned so that the resulting overhead from these segments will
not exceed 2% of the whole memory area. The rest of the memory area consists
of some access controlled segment whose control data resides in the management
segments and also a publicly accessible part. The exact ranges and borders of these
logical partitions are ﬁxed by card type. The overall logical structure of the memory
can be observed in Figure 5.1
The access control options wherever possible reﬂect the fact that the data written
to memory will be ﬁle systems rather than individual ﬁles. However, a few tag
speciﬁc security services diverge from this rule e.g access control conﬁgurations need
to be either implemented as part of the ﬁle system or as a service beside it.
5.3 Wireless Memory Layout
A more speciﬁc layout of the memory is deﬁned as follows and illustrated in Figure
5.2.
In this project the segments are all designed to be 4KB in size.
The master segment contains user-speciﬁc data and state relating to the whole
card. E.g. the division between the areas for management, access controlled
data and public memory areas.
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Figure 5.1. Overall memory layout
The PIN segment contains 256 PINs that can be used as read, write or edit PINs.
The access controlled segments can be associated with any of these PINs.
The Reader ID segment holds the IDs of the devices touching the tag. A host
may freely choose to give its Id to the tag or to remain anonymous. However,
some (searching / listing) services can make use of a host id to list e.g. segments
originating from a speciﬁc host.
The management segment(s) contain access control information for the individ-
ual 4kB segments in the access controlled area. The format of the management
segments and policy is further discussed later in this chapter.
The access controlled segments are conditionally accessible based on policy de-
ﬁned in the management segment(s)
The public memory area is publicly readable/writeable.
An example layout for the memory used in this project's development is shown
in Figure 5.3.
5.3.1 Master Area Layout
The master area is located in the ﬁrst addresses of the wireless memory tag. This
segment contains user-speciﬁc data and state relating to the whole card e.g. the
division between the areas for management, access controlled data and public mem-
ory areas. It also holds master PINs, state ﬂags and roll-back counter which will be
explicitly discussed in the following sections.
5. Threat Analysis and Security Architecture 35
Figure 5.2. Detailed memory layout
For security intentions master area is divided into one readable part and one
hidden part. The partitions are shown in Figure 5.4.
5.3.2 PINs Area Layout
PIN segment, like all other segments is 4KB in size and consists of 256 PINs which
can be used as read/write/edit PINs. Each PIN is designed to be 16 byte. The
256 PINs in the PIN area are indexed from 0 to 255. The PIN area is illustrated in
Figure 5.5.
5.3.3 Management Area Layout
The 4 KB of available memory in the management area is mapped into units of 32
Bytes each. Each of these units corresponds to a segment of the memory in the
access controlled area and contains the access control information of the respec-
tive segment. An example of management units associated with access controlled
segment is illustrated in Figure 5.6. The correspondence is purely based on the
addresses meaning that the unit with the lowest address position in management
area provides for the ﬁrst access controlled segment.
Each management unit can be separated into 5 essential parts:
Control byte contains the access control information such as read/write access for
the corresponding segment.
Life-cycle model more complex control solution for some speciﬁc segments. These
solutions include "write once, read many", "counter", "encryption for receiver"
5. Threat Analysis and Security Architecture 36
Figure 5.3. Example memory layout
Figure 5.4. Master area layout
and "tag assisted shared key" life-cycle models.
PIN counter keeps track of number of entries. It is used for retry protection.
PIN indexes are indexes to PINs in PIN area which represent the PINs for read-
/write and management area modiﬁcation (edit) protection of the correspond-
ing segments. 2 Bytes are reserved for each index which is for future prooﬁng
since for the 256 present PINs, 1 Byte would be enough. The indexes are
arranged in most signiﬁcant bit order (MSB).
Name is a 16 byte ﬁeld in each management unit. This 16 byte name can be used
as a segment speciﬁc password for reading and writing. It is also used for
ﬁle-system data management.
The overall layout of each management unit is illustrated in Figure 5.7.
Next, each individual attribute of the management unit is more explicitly dis-
cussed.
CTRL byte First byte of the control unit is the control byte. Control byte contains
information that deﬁnes basic access control rules for the segment. The CTRL bit
has the following bits deﬁned according to Figure 5.8
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Figure 5.5. PIN area layout
RD : A set RD bit indicates a read enabled segment. The segment is readable unless
the readability is controlled by a read PIN. Furthermore, a segment with RD
bit set to zero cannot be read even after providing the right read PIN. Meaning
that a set RD bit along with the right PIN ( in case the segment is protected
with a read PIN) are both needed to access a segment. For models ( which
will be described later) the read bit will also indicate whether the model is in
a state where the segment currently is readable.
RD PIN : When RD PIN bit is set, read PIN is enabled. This means that reads
from the segment would be protected by a 16 byte PIN and to have read access
the right PIN needs to be written in the read PIN register. The pointer to
read PIN ﬁeld in the management area indicates which of the 256 PINs needs
to be provided. It is important to note that even with the right read PIN, the
segment would not be accessible if the RD bit is not set.
WR : A set WR bit indicates a write enabled segment. The segment is writeable
unless the writability is controlled by a write PIN. Furthermore, a segment
with WR bit set to zero cannot be written to even after providing the right
write PIN. Meaning that a set WR bit along with the right PIN ( in case the
segment is protected with a write PIN) are both needed to access a segment.
For models ( which will be described later) the write bit will also indicate
whether the model is in a state where the segment currently is readable.
WR PIN : When WR PIN bit is set, write PIN is enabled. This means that
writes from the segment would be protected by a 16 byte PIN and to have
write access the right PIN needs to be written in the write PIN register. The
pointer to write PIN ﬁeld in the management area indicates which of the 256
PINs needs to be provided. It is important to note that even with the right
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Figure 5.6. An example of management units with corresponding access controlled seg-
ments
Figure 5.7. Management area layout
write PIN, the segment would not be accessible if the WR bit is not set.
PN : if the PN bit is set, the name will operate as a password. If enabled, the
contents of the name ﬁeld in the management area should be present in the
name register in order to access the segment. In this case the name ﬁeld in the
management unit is not readable to users. This validation works in addition
to any other read/write PIN protection that may be enabled for the segment.
If not set, the contents of the name ﬁeld will be readable to users.
nE : when nE bit is set the management unit of the corresponding segment will
be locked and would not be editable even by the owner. This is a permanent
condition, and is mainly used for counter implementation. It can be possible
that the nE bit would be hard-wired for a couple of predeﬁned segments which
may be needed for speciﬁc applications. In that case neither the nE bit nor
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Figure 5.8. Control byte layout
the segment can be edited by the host or the owner.
RFU : This bit is reserved for future uses.
M : setting this bit enables the model (extension) ﬁeld. There are a number of
life-cycle models available that can be used for diﬀerent segments and put
additional constraints on the access to the segment. M bit set to 0 indicates
the default model for the segment that acts purely according to the previously
explained bits.
Model byte The security architecture provides a set of additional access control
solutions and operations which enables use of segment in special use cases and during
the memory's life-cycle. Given that the model bit (M bit) in the CTRL byte is set,
this byte deﬁnes the life-cycle model operating on the respective segment. The 4
bits addressed in Figure 5.9 are currently used to indicate the model.
Figure 5.9. Model byte layout
The currently deﬁned models are listed below. More extensive and illustrative
declarations are included in the following chapters.
Default model (0)
Default model is the implicit model. When the "M" bit in "CTRL" byte is
set to zero, the default model is activated.
Write once, read many model (1)
When operating in this life-cycle model, the segment can only be written
to. Once written, the segment can only be accessed to be read and no write
operation is allowed any more. However reading the contents of the segment
is allowed as many times as desired.
In this mode, R/W bits are reﬂected according to model state but PR/PW/PN
bits work as normally.
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Counter model (2)
The counter model deﬁnes the segment to operate as a number of counters.
Each counter consumes 8 Bytes and the segment can contain a certain number
of counters working independent of each other. However all the counters belong
to a single segment, and the conﬁguration data is shared among all of them.
Using a segment in counter model sets the RD and WR bits in CTRL byte in
management unit to allow read and write access, however, "RD PIN", "WR
PIN" and "PN" bits can be conﬁgured according to application. For many use
cases it may be required that the "nE" bit would be set so that modiﬁcation
on the counter segments becomes impossible for the user. This also brings
restricted use for the owner too.
The 8 byte counter works in a manner that its value will only be updated if
the new value to be written is the old value of the counter slot plus one. Other
than this case writes to the counter will fail.
Encryption for receiver model (3)
This model implements a means to transfer a string to a receiver in an en-
crypted format such that the resulting crypto-text can be read from the tag
and re-transmitted by some other means to the expected receiver. This oper-
ation is done in a few phases:
• The receiver generates a key stream for the speciﬁc segment operating in
this model. This key stream is generated in a way that the host can later
recreate the key stream.
• Next, this generated key stream is written to the speciﬁed segment. In
this phase the segment is only writeable and not readable in the tag
interface.
• Finally, the sender writes the plain-text to the segment. This write op-
eration is a done in a speciﬁc manner by the tag. The tag XORs the
plain-text with the provided key stream by the receiver(which is cur-
rently written in the segment) and thus produces a crypto-text. This
crypto-text is then written to the segment. In this phase the crypto-text
in the segment becomes publicly readable, however, further writes to the
segment will fail.
Tag-assisted shared-key generation (4)
This model creates a tag-assisted mechanism for generating shared key streams
between the various hosts using the tag. This mechanism can be optionally
activated by the hosts and a host not willing to use shared keys can freely use
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the tag. This mechanism operates essentially like the previous model but in a
higher granularity. This operation can also be divided into two phases:
• When encountering a tag for the ﬁrst time, each host can write its own
speciﬁc key stream to the tag.
• After each new host entry, the tag produces pair-wise key streams between
all hosts using all the key streams. The produced keys will be stored in
the segment and will only be readable by the hosts that know how to
reconstruct their own individual key streams.
These shared keys between two individual hosts can be used to encrypt in-
formation, when transmitting it on the wireless memory between the paired
hosts.
5.4 Wireless Memory Operation
5.4.1 Authentication
In order to ascertain the genuineness of a tag when it initiates its ﬁrst communication
with the host, the host needs to authenticate the tag. Fake tags trying to connect
to the host memory will be known and denied access. Authentication mechanism is
more thoroughly discussed in section 2.2.5.
The wireless memory tag uses a challenge response mechanism to authenticate
genuine tags. Authenticated tags will be marked with setting the authentication
ﬂag bit which is located in the master area of the memory tag. When connecting
to memory tag for the ﬁrst time, the host checks the authentication ﬂag before any
other operation. If the bit for the ﬂag is set, a second time authentication is not
needed. On the other hand, in case of a cleared bit, the authentication process
should take place primarily.
Overall Lamport signing operation can be seen from Figure 5.10.
Figure 5.10. Using Lamport signature on the tag
For each bit in H(challenge) (shown in Figure 5.11), the corresponding hash value
is selected from the memory and is returned to the host.
The host device sends 256 challenge bits to the tag and receives 32 bytes for
each bit in return. In this project the Lamport signature is implemented so that in
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Figure 5.11. Lamport signature operation
each write cycle, the host device writes a one bye challenge to the tag. This write
operation has to be done to a special register with a known address used for the
authentication purpose. After each write, ﬁrst the authentication ﬂag in the Master
area of the memory is checked to determine whether the tag is authenticated or not.
In case of an unauthenticated tag, for each bit in the written 1 byte, 32 bytes will
be selected from either of the 2 key sets and returned to the tag. If the bit is "0",
32 bytes will be selected from the ﬁrst key set. Otherwise, in case of a "1" bit, 32
bytes are selected from the second key set. This return is then followed by erasing
the corresponding 32 bits from the memory. This procedure is continued until the
whole 256 ∗ 32 bytes are returned and erased. After the authentication process is
ﬁnished, the authentication ﬂag will be set in the master area. If the host chooses
not to authenticate the tag, sending 256 bits of zero to the speciﬁed address will
bypass the authentication process.
5.4.2 PIN Operation
Each access controlled segment is protected by 3 diﬀerent PINs. These PINs protect
segment when reading from or writing to the segment in addition to protecting the
edition of a segment's management area. 256 PINs are stored in the non-readable
PIN area discussed in section 5.3.2, and operations with PINs are done with help of
a number of registers.
Registers : 7 registers of 16 bytes each are used to hold the PINs, Name or
Reader ID. These registers use the ﬁnal addresses of the master area segment. These
registers are:
READ_PIN_REG_ADDR : Address used for the register holding the PIN
when reading from the segment (PIN challenge-response).
WRITE_PIN_REG_ADDR : Address used for the register holding the PIN
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when writing to a segment (PIN challenge-response).
EDIT_PIN_REG_ADDR : Address used for the register holding the PIN
when modifying a segment's management area (PIN challenge-response).
NAME_REG_ADDR : Address used for register holding the name for a seg-
ment (PIN challenge-response).
ID_REG_ADDR : Address used for the register holding the identity of the host,
if provided ( this is not an encrypted transfer). In case of commit register
transfers the contents of this register identiﬁes the owner domain.
COMMIT_REG_ADDR : Commit register (encrypted under one of owner's
PINs)
PA_REG : PIN access register. The structure of this register can be seen in
Figure 5.12.
Figure 5.12. PIN access Register (PA_REG) structure
Roll-back counter : All registers used for PINs support encrypted transfer of
the PINs to the wireless memory. This encryption is performed in counter mode.
Transfers in counter mode employ a card-speciﬁc global roll-back protection counter
(RBPCTR). Basically each PIN has to be encrypted with the roll-back counter
before being written to the wireless memory's commit register.
The roll-back counter operates just as the other counters in the memory architec-
ture. It consists of 8 bytes and can only be updated if the value of the counter plus
one is written to it. However, the memory should provide a dedicated persistent
roll-back counter for PIN transfer purposes.
The roll-back counter is additionally associated with a usage ﬂag. The purpose of
the usage ﬂag is to make sure that the value of the counter is updated before being
used for encryption. Whenever a write to one of the PIN registers is attempted, the
usage ﬂag is checked. Write attempt will fail in case the usage ﬂag is set, otherwise,
the usage ﬂag will be set to 1 and the write will succeed. Each time the counter is
updated the usage ﬂag is cleared.
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Master (owner) PINs There are a number of master PINs in the master area
of the wireless memory. These master PINs should be employed when changing or
uploading new PINs to the PIN area. Another rather important usage of master
PINs is in conﬁguring the access control system. Access controlled segments can
be conﬁgured individually or in groups. Master PINs help enable editing of the
management area in groups using one master PIN for all segments in the group
rather than using the individual edit PIN allocated to each segment.
The main reason for having several master PINs is to support backups or emer-
gency recovery of data. In addition to these reasons, the additional master PINs
can be used for sharing tag between e.g. family members, employees of a company,
etc.
Owner PINs are predeﬁned and cannot be changed. These PINs are referred to
by indexes e.g. ﬁrst slot is referred by index 0x00, second slot 0x01, etc. These PINs
may even not exist depending on the usage purpose of the tag. On the contrary, the
PINs can be more complex if the manufacturer of the wireless memory wants some
manufacturer-speciﬁc backup/restore mechanism.
PIN management The operations related to the PINs can be categorized into
using PINs and transferring PIN. The former refers to the usage PINs when at-
tempting to read/write/edit a PIN protected segment. The latter describes actions
needed when adding or modifying a PIN in the PIN area.
Both operations are protected against passive and replay attacks. Although the
authorization for accessing the segment is protected, the data transfer to or from it
is not protected if the data encryption already in the host is not applied.
The PIN transferring and usage is protected using block cipher encryption func-
tion E. The encryption function E used in this project is XXTEA block cipher
described in section 2.2.1. XXTEA has a key length of 16 bytes and operates on 16
byte data blocks.
Using PINs : PINs are used in an implicit challenge-response protocol based on
the roll-back counter. Every time a submitted PIN is validated, it is maintained in
an internal register for faster operations in case of e.g. ﬁle-systems that may share
a PIN among a number of segments. The PIN is maintained in the register until a
power-down occurs. All indexes are reset to zero at power-up.
The operation illustrated in Figure 5.13 can be described in 4 steps:
1. The host uses the ﬁrst bytes of the PIN access register (PA_REG) to indicate
which PIN is going to be used.
2. Next, the PIN in given position is encrypted using the previously updated
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Figure 5.13. Using PINs operation
counter by the host (EPIN(RBPCTR)). Meanwhile the tag calculates the
encrypted hash value for the given PIN using the same encryption function.
3. Then the encrypted PIN provided by the host is compared to the one produced
by the tag. If the values match, the index of the used PIN is written to the
relating internal register.
4. Finally when the host attempts to access the protected segment with the
aforementioned PIN, the access is granted if the index in the internal register
matches the index of the PIN used for that segment. If the indexes do not
match the access is denied.
PIN in location zero of the PIN area is reserved to contain all zeros. This can
be used for transferring names and IDs from hosts that are not aware of the PINs
for this speciﬁc card. As a result the encryption for the register will be still done,
however using a globally known key.
Transferring PINs : All PINs are transferred to PIN area in an encrypted for-
mat. The operation illustrated in Figure 5.14 can be described in 3 steps:
1. The host uses the PIN access register (PA_REG) to indicate which position
in PIN area the PIN is intended for, which master (owner) PIN is used for
encryption and a hash value used for protection from Denial of Service (DoS).
The denial of service protection ﬁeld is used to make it diﬃcult to mount
attacks by which PINs are randomly changed to cause denial of service. The
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Figure 5.14. Transporting PINs operation
DoS value is obtained by encrypting the value written to the COMMIT_REG
with the speciﬁed master PIN and choosing the last 12 bytes. Assuming
encryption function E, this means
Emasterpin((Emasterpin(RBPCTR))XORPIN)[4..16]
The structure of the PA_REG can be seen in Figure 5.12.
2. Next, the speciﬁed master PIN in the PA_REG is encrypted with the counter
(Emasterpin(RBPCTR)) and then the product is XORed with the PIN which
is going to be written in the speciﬁed position in the PIN area. Assuming
encryption function E, the host will write:
(Emasterpin(RBPCTR))XORPIN
to the COMMIT_REG.
3. If the DoS value matches the expected one, the values are decrypted in the
wireless memory and the PIN will be written to the speciﬁed position in the
PIN area.
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Read PIN operation To read from a read PIN protected segment, the PIN whose
index is found in the management area of the segment should be provided to the
tag by the host. To do so, the host should ﬁrst write the 16 byte read PIN to the
register in the address READ_PIN_REG_ADDR and then attempt to normally
read from the segment. Then If:
1. the RD bit in the segment's management area's CTRL byte is set and
2. the RD PIN bit in the segment's management area's CTRL byte is and
3. the PIN written to READ_PIN_REG_ADDR address matches the one that
the pointer in the management data points to,
the segment can be accessed for reads by the device.
Write PIN operation To write to a write PIN protected segment, the PIN whose
index is found in the management area of the segment should be provided to the
tag by the host. To do so, the host should ﬁrst write the 16 byte write PIN to the
register in the address WRITE_PIN_REG_ADDR and then attempt to normally
write to the segment. Then If:
1. the WR bit in the segment's management area's CTRL byte is set and
2. the WR PIN bit in the segment's management area's CTRL byte is set and
3. the PIN written to WRITE_PIN_REG_ADDR address matches the one that
the pointer in the management data points to,
the segment can be accessed for writes by the device.
Edit PIN operation To edit a segment's management unit, the PIN whose in-
dex is found in the unit should be provided to the tag by the host. To do so,
the host should ﬁrst write the 16 byte edit PIN to the register in the address
EDIT_PIN_REG_ADDR and then attempt to normally write to the management
unit. Then if:
1. the nE bit in the management unit's CTRL byte is cleared and
2. the write does not exceed one unit's boundary and
3. the PIN written to EDIT_PIN_REG_ADDR address matches the one that
the pointer in the management data points to
the management unit can be edited by the host.
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5.4.3 Name Operation
Name ﬁeld can be used as capability i.e the name located in NAME ﬁeld of the
management unit operating as an additional PIN for the segment. The last 16 bytes
of the management unit are assigned as the name ﬁeld and are hidden from the host
in case the name works as capability.
The NR bit in the management area is what deﬁnes the name ﬁeld's operation. If
the NR bit is set, the name ﬁeld will act as a capability. When accessing a segment
with NR bit set, the name should be written to the register NAME_REG_ADDR.
If the name written to the register matches the name in the segment's corresponding
name ﬁeld, the read/write access will be granted to the host.
5.4.4 Reader ID Operation
A full segment in the memory layout is dedicated to storing the reader IDs. This
segment works as a table holding the IDs of all the hosts that have communicated
with the tag.
Whenever a device touches the tag two scenarios may happen. First, if the device
has never touched the memory tag before, its ID will be added to the ﬁrst empty
position in the reader ID area in the memory. The device can also freely choose not
to add its ID to the table by sending all zeros as its ID. Second scenario is that the
device has communicated with the tag before in which case the table will not be
updated.
The operation related to writing the reader ID to the ID segment is done via a
register located in address ID_REG_ADDR.
5.4.5 Management Area Operation
As stated in section 5.3.3, another full segment in memory is dedicated to data
related to the access management of the access controlled segments. In this project
there are 27 access controlled segments of 4 Kbytes. 32 byte of management data
is assigned to each of the segments which are used to conﬁgure segment's access
operations. The overall layout of the contents of this 32 bytes can be observed in
Figure 5.7.
Editing management area is protected with edit PINs which area allocated to
each of the 32 byte units. Other than using individual edit PIN for each unit,
master PINs are also deﬁned to enable editing of several units in management area.
To protect the information in the following management unit, no read or write
operations occurring in this area can exceed a units boundary. This results in
writes of maximum 32 bytes in size. The other restriction on read attempts from
the management unit limits the reads to the ﬁrst four bytes which includes CTRL,
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RFU, MODEL and PIN CTR bytes. The remaining 18 bytes will be masked by zeros.
Additionally, all writes to the management unit are accepted on the condition that
the nE bit in the management unit is cleared.
To edit management area, either the PIN whose index appears in the unit or one of
the master PINS should be written to the register in address EDIT_PIN_REG_ADDR.
If the submitted PIN is validated, the index will be maintained in the internal regis-
ter to enable editing of other segments using the same PIN. No editing attempt will
be successful in case the nE bit in the CTRL byte of the management unit is set.
5.4.6 Life-cycle Models
When deﬁned to operate in a speciﬁc life-cycle model, a segment engages additional
speciﬁc behaviour to the default access settings provided. Applying a life-cycle
model to a segment is done by setting the model bit in CTRL byte and selecting the
appropriate model using the model byte in the segment's management area. There
are 5 life-cycle models implemented on the tag architecture:
Default model: Read and write accesses are controlled according to the CTRL
byte in the management area.
Write once, read many model: A segment operating in this life-cycle is initially
write-only and not readable. After the ﬁrst write, segment's management data
alters in a way that it becomes read-only and not writeable.
Counter model: A segment operating in counter model grants all read accesses,
however only writing the contents of the counter plus one is successful. The
counter model only allows writes that start from the beginning address of each
counter.
Encryption for receiver model: This encryption model takes advantage of XOR
operation and thus it is also called XOR model. XOR model can be divided
into three stages:
1. WO1: In this stage the segment is write only. Normal write can be done
to the segment in this stage. Writes can be protected with PINs.
2. WO2: Like the ﬁrst stage, this stage is also a write only stage. However,
all data written to the wireless memory at this stage will be ﬁrst XORed
with the key-stream written to the same location in the previous stage.
This "XOR" write can be also protected with PINs.
3. RM: In the third stage, the contents of the segment can be only read.
The state of a segment in the XOR model cannot be modiﬁed by editing the
management data but can be changed using a speciﬁc operation.
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Tag-assisted shared-key generation model: As explained in section 5.3.3, the
purpose of this model is to generate shared key-streams between various hosts
using the tag. These generated key streams are intended for secure transfer
and integrity.
Whenever a device encounters a new wireless tag, it can submit a key-stream
to it. The tag checks for ID overlapping and if the ID is detected as new,
writes it to the reader ID area of the memory.
The process happening in the card after inserting a new id{x+1} and key-
stream KS{x+1} can be described as:
For i = 1 to x:
KTS{i}[x+ 1][id] = KTS{i}[x+ 1][id] XOR id{x+ 1}
KTS{x+ 1}[i][id] = KTS{x+ 1}[i][id] XOR id{i}
KTS{i}[x + 1][key] = KTS{i}[x + 1][key] XOR KTS{i}[x + 1][km] XOR
KTS{x+ 1}[i][km]
KTS{x + 1}[i][key] = KTS{x + 1}[i][key] XOR KTS{i}[x + 1][km] XOR
KTS{x+ 1}[i][km]
KTS{i}[x+ 1][id] = 0
KTS{x+ 1}[i][id] = 0
End
where the size of one key-stream slot (KTS) is len(id) + 2 ∗ len(key).
Of the whole key-stream written by a host device, only the parts that are
not yet used up for generating shared keys with other devices are readable
and accessible by devices. beginning parts of the key-stream which have gone
through the shared key operation are hidden from host devices.
devices can also choose to only write their IDs and not provide a key-stream for
shared-key generation. The IDs of these devices are written to the reader ID
area of the wireless memory from ending addresses of the segment, in contrast
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with other devices with shared keys whose IDs are written to the reader ID
area from the beginning addresses of the segment.
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6. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND
IMPLEMENTATION
6.1 Security Analysis
This section addresses the security mechanisms employed in the wireless memory's
architecture and how they help solve possible security threads.
Some of the threads have been dealt with using memory life-cycle models that
can be optionally activated or deactivated on speciﬁc sections of the memory. On
the other hand, some mechanisms are automatically adopted in memory operations.
First thread to be prevented when encountering a wireless tag for the ﬁrst time
would be impersonating, that is a faulty or fake memory imitating actions of a gen-
uine one to obtain access to sensitive data. A genuine memory can be recognized
using an authentication algorithm. A host may either communicate with the tag
without authenticating it or after employing an authentication algorithm. The for-
mer case occurs when the host trusts the memory, manufacturer or vendor, etc. In
the latter case, the host's security architecture will only allow it to communicate
with memories that are ﬂagged as authenticated i.e. a bit in the memory's master
area set to one. Otherwise, no communication or operation will be successful before
the memory is authenticated.
The security architecture implemented in this project employs the Lamport sig-
nature as the means for authentication as mentioned in section 5.4.1. Lamport
signature is an ineﬃcient asymmetric signature scheme in the sense that every sign-
ing key should be used only once and public key and signatures are big in size.
One initial signature is stored in the tag when manufactured. The signature
provided is a Lamport one-time signature, since the private-key operation can be
performed by the wireless tag. Tag's access control architecture ascertains that the
private key is used only once and erased after use. In order to enable several hosts
to certify the tag, several keys should exist on the tag.
If the wireless memory fails to complete the whole challenge response in the Lam-
port signature, it will not be ﬂagged as authenticated. Therefore no communication
is allowed with the memory. The details of the process are explained in section 5.4.1.
To avoid eavesdropping threats, the transfer of private data (PINs) are done in
an encrypted manner. No PIN can be sent to the wireless memory before being
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encrypted. This results in the fact that listening to the communication channel by
adversaries will only result in gaining information which is not understandable by
the attacker. The encryption method adopted in this architecture uses XXTEA
block cipher and a roll-back counter. A value from the roll-back counter may only
be used once and should be updated before the next use. The XXTEA block cipher
operation details can be found in section 2.2.1.
Sending of PINs to the memory include both using a PIN and storing a PIN to the
list of PINs in PIN area. PINs sent to get access to protected areas of memory are
encrypted with the roll-back counter only. However, to avoid attackers attempting
to write PINs to PIN area (which they can later use to obtain access to protected
segments of memory) two steps of encryption are done to the PIN:
• First an encryption with one of the few master PINs, which are only known
by the authorized users.
• second Encryption with the roll-back counter.
These steps help prevent malicious attackers to store their own speciﬁc PINs in
the card. Consequently, an adversary can neither overhear the PINs already in the
PIN area while being transmitted to the memory, nor can it add PINs to the PIN
area. As a result, PIN protected areas cannot be accessed by an attacker.
To avoid denial of service attacks by randomly changing PINs, a few bytes are
also allocated to DoS protection which are a part of the resulting bytes from the
aforementioned 2 step encryption done to the PIN being transferred.
To be able to move sensitive data to a speciﬁed receiver in a way that the data
can be only comprehended by that speciﬁc receiver, a life-cycle model is adopted
in the wireless memory's security. This life-cycle model protects the data in the
memory from anyone other than the intended receiver.
A segment in memory operating in this life-cycle model will be only readable after
being encrypted hence over-writes from potential attackers is are prevented. For the
data to be readable by the receiver, the host has to ﬁrst generate a key stream that
it can regenerate later. At this stage the segment is not readable to protect the
key stream from adversaries. Later, in the sender side, the sender writes the data
to that speciﬁc segment and the security architecture implemented in the memory
takes care of encrypting the data with the written key-stream. Therefore, the data
in the segment can be only readable by the owner of the key-stream. Details of the
operation of segments in this life-cycle can be found in section 5.4.6.
To implement the encryption for receiver but in a coarser version, another life-
cycle model is designed named "tag-assisted shared key". This model allows diﬀerent
hosts to generate shared keys with each other to be used later for sharing data that
should be understandable just by the two paired sides. The aforementioned shared
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key is generated by the wireless memory using the two hosts' IDs and part of a
key-stream that each host writes to the segment operating in this life-cycle model.
Part of the key-stream that is used up for creating a pairwise key with a certain
host cannot be read from the memory. Only the pair of hosts that were involved in
creating that shared key can reconstruct their own individual key from the shared
key. Using this key, sensitive data can be moved to and from a pair of host in
encrypted manner. To mitigate eavesdropping threats on this data transfer, a host
may choose to write several IDs to a given tag.
The security mechanism implemented using life-cycle models are associated with
speciﬁc segments. The architecture should have a way to make it impossible, if
needed, for hosts to change the operating model for a segment. First mechanism
to provide this would be edit PINs which can be allocated to all segments and
thus protect the segment's management area from unauthorized changes. Next step
protection should be applied in case even users knowing the PINs should not be
allowed to change the segment's operation settings. This is done using a bit in each
segment's management area (not editable bit) explained in section 5.3.3. Setting
this bit will make a segment with permanent conﬁguration in management area
hence no change can be done to that segment.
6.2 Implementation
To achieve an overview of the resulting architecture for the security of the wireless
memory, some measurements from the ﬁnal design of the architecture, sample codes
and tests cases are introduced in this section.
6.2.1 Measurements
Some essential criteria that should be considered in the overall design of the wireless
memory's security architecture would be:
• the timing of the diﬀerent operations
• the size (area on the FPGA board) of the design
• and the amount of memory needed for the code
The three factors mentioned above are monitored using Quartus II and Nios II tools
and the results are as follows:
Timing Here the performance of the designed architecture is studied in the context
of the number of clock cycles each operation takes to be completed. Total execution
time of these functions depends on the system's operating frequency. The frequency
of the Nios II processor's clock is set to 100 MHz during these measurement.
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Table 6.1 shows some of the employed operations in the system and number of
clock cycles it takes them to be executed completely.
Operation Number of clock cycles
Authentication 5,498,172
Shared Key 7,970,780
Counter Update 18,198
Read PIN 1,676,095
Write PIN 1,631,559
EDIT PIN 1,662,211
Name 1,368,767
Table 6.1. Execution clock cycles
Area on FPGA Looking at Quartus II synthesis results, number of the logic ele-
ments utilized on the used FPGA board can be estimated to be 8246 elements. This
number can vary when using diﬀerent families of FPGA boards. In this synthesis
Cyclon II EP2C70F672C6 is used. More detailed numbers on the used elements on
the FPGA can be found in table 6.2
Element Number
Total combinational functions 6,141
Dedicated logic registers 5,673
Total logic elements 8,246
Total registers 5,673
Total pins 10
Embedded multiplier 4
Total PLLs 1
Table 6.2. FPGA measurements
Memory The code for the security architecture which is run on the FPGA's Nios
II processor is stored in a RAM memory. The size of the ﬁnal code used for the
architecture is approximately 25 KBytes (25360 bytes). Table 6.3 shows the code
size in diﬀerent phases of implementation
6.2.2 Testing
A series of test codes were designed to validate the functionality of the architecture.
Using a Linux machine as the host, the test codes imitate the possible requests by
a host and veriﬁes the responses from the wireless memory. Some of the test cases
are introduced in this section.
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Phase Code size (in bytes)
Simple communication with memory 5,120
PIN & name protection added 8,232
Lamport signature added 11,980
Counter life-cycle model added 14,840
XXTEA added 15,512
XOR life-cycle model added 21,252
Shared key life-cycle model added 25,360
Table 6.3. Code size in diﬀerent steps of implementation
Test case 1: Access control to a segment protected by write PIN
Steps included in this test case will validate the memory's access control capabilities.
In these steps ﬁrst the corresponding management area of a segment is conﬁgured to
be protected with write PINs and readable without PINs. Then show how ﬁrst write
to such segment fails without the right PIN and after providing the right PIN, a
successful write operation can be conﬁrmed by reading the contents of the segment.
Step 1: The management data of the segment should be changed to readable and
protected writes. To edit management area, the roll-back counter should be updated
and the relating edit PIN for that segment should be transferred to the memory in
an encrypted format.
// updating counter
address = 0x000022 // adre s s o f the RBCNT in memory
indata = 0x0000000000000001
write_bytes
// The PA_REG
address = 0x001F80 // address o f r e g i s t e r used f o r PA\_REG
indata = 0x00000000 // the index to the ed i t PIN f o r the segment
write_bytes
// g iv ing encrypted ed i t PIN number 0
address = 0x001FD0 // address o f r e g i s t e r used f o r ed i t PINs
indata = 0 x357a91e1f6378158acfd77e0059678ee
write_bytes
// changing the management data f o r second segment
address = 0x003020 // adre s s o f the management data f o r the second segment
indata = 0xb0 // s e t t i n g WR PIN b i t & RD b i t
write_bytes
Step 2: In this step, a write is done to the segment without providing the PIN
and then read from the same address. It can be seen that the contents have not
changed.
// Writing to PIN protec ted segment
address = 0x005000 // address o f the second segment
indata = 0xaabbccddaabbccdd
write_bytes
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// read ing from segment
address = 0x005000
read_8_bytes
outdata = 0x0000000000000000 // the contents o f the segment have not changed
Step 3: In the ﬁnal step, the right write PIN is provided and then, the successful
write is veriﬁed by reading the contents of the segment.
// updating counter
address = 0x000022
indata = 0x00dd000000000002
write_bytes
// The PA_REG
address = 0x001F80
indata = 0x00000004 // the index to the wr i t e PIN f o r the segment
write_bytes
// g ive encrypted wr i t e PIN f o r p o s i t i o n 4
address = 0x001FE0 // address o f r e g i s t e r used f o r wr i t e PINs
indata = 0x9808b391341a7a2a83121944957169f5
write_bytes
// Writing to PIN protec ted segment
address = 0x005000 // address o f the second segment
indata = 0xaabbccddaabbccdd
write_bytes
// read ing from segment
address = 0x005000
read_8_bytes
outdata = 0xaabbccddaabbccdd
// the content s o f the segment have changed a f t e r prov id ing the r i g h t PIN
Test case 2: Encryption for receiver model
This test case aims to verify the operation of segments in a speciﬁc life-cycle model:
encryption for receiver model. To achieve this goal, ﬁrst a segment is conﬁgured to
operate in this model, then the segment is tested during the diﬀerent states of its
life-cycle.
Step 1: The management data of the segment should be changed to operate in
the encryption for receiver model. To edit management area, the roll-back counter
should be updated and the relating edit PIN for that segment should be transferred
to the memory in an encrypted format.
// updating counter
address = 0x000022 // adre s s o f the RBCNT in memory
indata = 0x0000000000000003
write_bytes
// The PA_REG
address = 0x001F80 // address o f r e g i s t e r used f o r PA\_REG
indata = 0x00000000 // the index to the ed i t PIN f o r the segment
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write_bytes
// g iv ing encrypted ed i t PIN number 0
address = 0x001FD0 // address o f r e g i s t e r used f o r ed i t PINs
indata = 0 x357a91e1f6378158acfd77e0059678ee
write_bytes
// changing the management data f o r second segment
address = 0x003020 // adre s s o f the management data f o r the second segment
indata = 0x210004 // s e t t i n g model to 4
write_bytes
Step 2: In this step, a key-stream is written to the segment, and in this stage
the segment should not be readable. Then some bytes of data are written to the
segment which will be XORed before being written to the segment by the tag.
// wr i t i ng 2∗32B to the segment , WO1 stage
// 0x008000 = 32768
f o r ( ( i =32768; i <=32800; i +=32)) // wr i t i ng 2∗32 bytes beg inning from address 0x8000
do
indata = 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
write_bytes
// read ing from the segment
address = 0x8000
read_32_bytes
outdata = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
// read ing f a i l e d , only z e r o s were returned as expected
// wr i t i ng 2∗32B in the segment , WO2 stage
// 008000 = 32768
f o r ( ( i =32768; i <=32832; i +=32)) // wr i t i ng 2∗32 bytes beg inning from address 0x8000
do
indata = 0x3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333
write_bytes
Step 3: After this stage the segment can be read and checked to validate if the
XOR operation has been done successfully.
// Reading the XORed segment , RM stage
// 008000 = 32768
f o r ( ( i =32768; i <=32832; i +=32))
do
read_32_bytes
outdata = 0x2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
outdata = 0x2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222
Test case 3: Authentication
The target of this test case is to verify if the authentication algorithm implemented
on the tag functions as expected. This test attempts to communicate with the tag
before and during the process and thus validates that these attempts fail. After
completing the authentication process, the tag is again tested to prove that it works
normally then.
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Step 1: To make sure that the tag is not authenticated before, the authentication
ﬂag should be cleared. This operation will not be possible in the ﬁnal security
architecture, however during testing, this option is available to enable multiple runs
of the test.
/∗ Writing 1 to address 0x20 to make the tag authent i ca ted
This opt ion w i l l not be p o s s i b l e in the r e a l v e r s i on
and i s only a v a i l a b l e f o r t e s t i n g reasons ∗/
address=000020
indata=01
write_bytes
Step 2: Now two sets of private keys are required in the memory to be used in
the Lamport signing operation. This step is also done only for testing purposes.
// address
#01B000 == 110592
// wr i t i ng dummy data to two o f the segments
// to be used as the two s e t s o f p r i va t e keys
f o r ( ( i =110592; i <=110720; i +=32))
do
indata =122334455667788990011223344556677889900112233445566778899001AABB
write_bytes
done
Step 3: Now before authenticating the tag, an attempt to communicate with the
tag is done. This attempt fails as the tag is still not ensured to be genuine.
// read ing from a random segment
address=002000
read_8_bytes
outdata = 0x0000000000000000
It can be seen that all zeros were returned which shows that the read attempt
has been unsuccessful.
Step 4: In this step challenges are written to the tag and the corresponding re-
sponses are read which will result in the tag to be authenticated.
// wr i t i ng cha l l e n g e s ( t h i s s tep i s repeated 256 t imes )
address=001F90
indata=00
write_bytes
// Reading r e sponse s ( t h i s s tep i s repeated 256 t imes )
address=001F90
read_32_bytes
Step 5: In this step the same segment that was read before authentication is read
and the real contents of the segment should be shown as the authentication is done
successfully.
// read ing from the random segment
address=002000
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read_8_bytes
outdata = 0x1122334411223344
Step 6: Now the segments containing the Lamport keys are read to check if they
are erased as they are supposed to.
address=01B000
read_32_bytes
outdata = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
It can be seen that all zeros are returned showing that the segment does not
contain the private keys any more.
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7. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, some mechanisms to implement access control, authentication and
secure life-cycle management in the tag side of a wireless memory system were devel-
oped and analysed. Furthermore, algorithms to ensure conﬁdentiality and integrity
of the wireless channel between the host and the tag were introduced.
The security architecture is built up on the fact that the memory is divided
into diﬀerent segments, each segment operating in a certain manner. Each segment
is conﬁgured using that segment's corresponding management area. Setting some
bits in segment's management area can deﬁne the segment as access controlled,
separately for "read"s and "write"s. Such segments would require a 16 byte PIN
to allow the host to do changes to the segment's data or read the information.
To ensure further security, modifying the management area of a segment can be
optionally also protected by PINs.
In addition to the PINs, each segment has an associated 16 byte name which is
stored in the segment's management area. This name can be used for ﬁle-system
data management or act as an additional PIN for the segment. As a result each
access controlled segment can be protected by three diﬀerent PINs.
A few number of owner (master) PINs are also stored in the memory which are
predeﬁned and cannot be changed. The main purpose of these PINs is to support
backups or emergency recovery of data. However, they can also be used for shar-
ing the tag between family members, employees of a company, and other similar
purposes.
Another extra protection added is the use of an option which, if enabled, will
make any further changes impossible to a segment and its management area. This
will be a permanent condition for a segment and locks it in a certain mode. This
option can be useful in some speciﬁc applications where no changes by the user
should be allowed and the security may be endangered by changing the operation
of a part of memory.
Operations which involve moving PINs (using PINs and transferring PINs) are
protected against attacks in the employed architecture. This was implemented using
block cipher encryption function XXTEA which has key length of 16 bytes and
operates on 16 byte data blocks. XXTEA protects the transmission of keys against
a passive attacker that listens to the communication over the air interface between
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the reader and the wireless memory tag, but does not insert his own messages into
that interface. When encrypting the PINs, a few bytes are also added to avoid denial
of service attacks by randomly changing PINs.
Additionally, the master host may choose to encrypt some of the data before it
stores it on the wireless memory. This encryption is performed in the master host
using the AES block cipher.
It is required that before the ﬁrst initialization by the "owner" of the tag, the
host checks that the wireless memory tag has been certiﬁed by its manufacturer.
This check, if successful, is a kind of guarantee that the tag behaves as speciﬁed.
A challenge-response technique, which is commonly used in authentication proto-
cols, on the air interface was employed in tag's security architecture. This technique
will guarantee the genuineness of the tag before allowing any communication with
it. The employed mechanism is the Lamport signature. Once the authentication
process is done, the tag will be marked as authenticated and further communication
with the tag is allowed.
Some other security functions are implemented as life-cycles for diﬀerent seg-
ments. These life-cycles include : 1. write once, read many 2. counter 3. encryption
for receiver 4. tag-assisted shared key generation. These functions provide more
speciﬁc secured transfer of data and can be enabled using a segment's management
area.
During this project, the described security architecture was implemented and
demonstrated. The correct and safe behaviour of the wireless tag has been ensured
through intensive testing of the tag operations.
The measurements from the number of clock cycles taken by each of the security
operations show promising results in the sense that it can be seen that these opera-
tions can be done within an acceptable time and with low latency. Additionally, the
amount of memory used by the security software is no more than 25 Kbytes which
is an extremely low amount in comparison with the available space.
The access control methods implemented in this project provide partial protection
for the data stored in the wireless memory tag in the case that the tag is lost or
stolen. Other protective measures include making a backup copy of the data, and
tamper-prooﬁng the tag: an attempt to open the cover will destruct the data. These
additional measures are not speciﬁed further in this project.
The aforementioned features guarantee the secure life-cycle of the wireless tag
and can be employed using the limited processing available in the tag.
In the future, when more processing capabilities in the wireless memory are avail-
able, the wireless memory security features may be expanded. The protocols devel-
oped in this project will remain essentially the same when the block cipher com-
ponent is upgraded to a more sophisticated one (like AES) in the future. The
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advantage of the more sophisticated block cipher is that it will better protect the
key transmission against an active attacker.
Three patents have been ﬁled from the wireless memory system project at Nokia
Research Center. Also, the architecture is used as input material in standardization
(Jedec TG649_1 Wireless Memory Standard).
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A. APENDICES
A.1 XXTEA Reference Code
The XXTEA algorithm used as the encryption function in this thesis is shown below[1].
#inc lude <s td i n t . h>
#de f i n e DELTA 0x9e3779b9
#de f i n e MX ( ( ( z>>5^y<<2)+(y>>3^z<<4))^((sum^y) + ( key [ ( p&3)^e ]^ z ) ) )
void btea ( uint32_t ∗v , i n t n , uint32_t const key [ 4 ] ) {
uint32_t y , z , sum ;
unsigned p , rounds , e ;
i f (n > 1) { /∗ Coding Part ∗/
rounds = 6 + 52/n ;
sum = 0 ;
z = v [ n−1] ;
do {
sum += DELTA;
e = (sum >> 2) & 3 ;
f o r (p=0; p<n−1; p++) {
y = v [ p+1] ;
z = v [ p ] += MX;
}
y = v [ 0 ] ;
z = v [ n−1] += MX;
} whi l e (−−rounds ) ;
}
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A.2 Code samples
A.2.1 Authentication
In this section parts of the code related to the authentication process is presented. This represent only one challenge-
responses out of the 256 challenges and responses in the actual process.
// ∗∗∗∗ r e c e i v i n g the cha l l eng e f o r one 32 Byte out o f 256 32 Bytes ∗∗∗∗
i f ( ( ( data [ 4 ] ) & (0 x01 ) ) == 0 )
{
// s e l e c t from the f i r s t s e t and send back to base band
R_CMDBUF[ 0 ] = M_READ;
R_CMDBUF[ 1 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( ( (KEY_SET1_ADDR)) >> 16) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 2 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( ( (KEY_SET1_ADDR)) >> 8) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 3 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( ( (KEY_SET1_ADDR)) >> 0) & 0xFF ) ;
send_to_FLASH(R_CMDBUF, 3 6 ) ;
read_from_FLASH(R_DATABUF, 3 6 ) ;
f o r ( i=0 ; i <36 ; i++)
R_KEY[ i ] = R_DATABUF[ i ] ;
a l t_p r i n t f (" returned from f i r s t s e t \n " ) ;
}
i f ( ( ( data [ 4 ] ) & (0 x01 ) ) != 0 )
{
// s e l e c t from the second s e t and sending back to base−band
R_CMDBUF[ 0 ] = M_READ;
R_CMDBUF[ 1 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( ( (KEY_SET2_ADDR)) >> 16) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 2 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( ( (KEY_SET2_ADDR)) >> 8) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 3 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( ( (KEY_SET2_ADDR)) >> 0) & 0xFF ) ;
send_to_FLASH(R_CMDBUF, 3 6 ) ;
read_from_FLASH(R_DATABUF, 3 6 ) ;
f o r ( i=0 ; i <36 ; i++)
R_KEY[ i ] = R_DATABUF[ i ] ;
a l t_p r i n t f (" returned from second s e t \n " ) ;
}
// e r a s i ng used 32 Bytes from f i r s t key s e t
R_CMDBUF[ 0 ] = M_WRITE;
R_CMDBUF[ 1 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( ( (KEY_SET1_ADDR)) >> 16) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 2 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( ( (KEY_SET1_ADDR)) >> 8) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 3 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( ( (KEY_SET1_ADDR)) >> 0) & 0xFF ) ;
f o r ( i = 4 ; i <36 ; i++)
R_CMDBUF[ i ] = 0 ;
send_to_FLASH(R_CMDBUF, 3 6 ) ;
read_from_FLASH(R_DATABUF, 3 6 ) ;
// e r a s i ng the used 32 Bytes from second key s e t
R_CMDBUF[ 0 ] = M_WRITE;
R_CMDBUF[ 1 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( ( (KEY_SET2_ADDR)) >> 16) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 2 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( ( (KEY_SET2_ADDR)) >> 8) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 3 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( ( (KEY_SET2_ADDR)) >> 0) & 0xFF ) ;
f o r ( i = 4 ; i <36 ; i++)
R_CMDBUF[ i ] = 0 ;
send_to_FLASH(R_CMDBUF, 3 6 ) ;
read_from_FLASH(R_DATABUF, 3 6 ) ;
A. Apendices 70
// ∗∗∗∗ r e c e i v i n g the re sponse to cha l l eng e f o r one 32 Byte out o f 256 32 Bytes ∗∗∗∗
i f ( (R_CODE == M_READ) && (R_ADDR == 0x001F90 ) && ( authen_f == 0))
{
send_to_BB(R_KEY, 3 6 ) ;
}
wr i te_authent icated :
R_CMDBUF[ 0 ] = M_WRITE;
R_CMDBUF[ 1 ] = 0x0 ;
R_CMDBUF[ 2 ] = 0x0 ;
R_CMDBUF[ 3 ] = 0x20 ;
R_CMDBUF[ 4 ] = 0x01 ;
send_to_FLASH(R_CMDBUF, 5 ) ;
read_from_FLASH(R_DATABUF, 5 ) ;
A.2.2 Shared-key Generation Model
In this section parts of the tag-assisted shared key generation life-cycle model implementation is shown:
// s t a r t i n g froom the second new ID the shar ing p roc c e s s s t a r t s
i f (ID_ADDR_PTR >= 0x002020 )
{
READER_NUM = ( ( ( ID_ADDR_PTR) − 0x002010 ) / 0x10 ) ;
f o r ( k=0 ; k<READER_NUM ; k++){
// Reading IDs o f prev ious r eade r s
R_CMDBUF[ 0 ] = M_READ;
R_CMDBUF[ 1 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR) >> 16) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 2 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR) >> 8) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 3 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR) >> 0) & 0xFF) −
(0 x10 ∗(READER_NUM − k ) ) ;
send_to_FLASH(R_CMDBUF, 2 0 ) ;
read_from_FLASH(R_DATABUF, 2 0 ) ;
f o r ( i =0; i <16 ; i++)
R_KEY[ i+(k ∗48 ) ] = R_KEY[ i+(k ∗48) ]^ R_DATABUF[ i +4] ;
// read ing keys o f the prev ious dev i c e s
R_CMDBUF[ 0 ] = M_READ;
R_CMDBUF[ 1 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR1) >> 16) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 2 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR1) >> 8) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 3 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR1) >> 0) & 0xFF ) ;
send_to_FLASH(R_CMDBUF, 5 2 ) ;
read_from_FLASH(R_DATABUF, 5 2 ) ;
f o r ( i=0 ; i <16 ; i++)
R_CMDBUF[ i +4] = R_READER_ID[ i ]^R_DATABUF[ i +4] ;
f o r ( i=16 ; i <32 ; i++)
R_CMDBUF[ i +4] =
R_DATABUF[ i +4]^R_DATABUF[ i +20]^R_KEY[ i+16+(k ∗ 4 8 ) ] ;
f o r ( i=32 ; i <48 ; i++)
R_CMDBUF[ i +4] = 0 ;
// wr i t i ng the shared key to the prev ious dev i c e s
R_CMDBUF[ 0 ] = M_WRITE;
R_CMDBUF[ 1 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR1) >> 16) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 2 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR1) >> 8) & 0xFF ) ;
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R_CMDBUF[ 3 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR1) >> 0) & 0xFF ) ;
send_to_FLASH(R_CMDBUF, 6 8 ) ;
read_from_FLASH(R_CMDBUF, 6 8 ) ;
f o r ( i =16; i <32 ; i++)
R_KEY[ i+(k ∗48 ) ] =
R_KEY[ i+(k ∗48) ]^R_KEY[ i+16+(k ∗48) ]^R_DATABUF[ i +20] ;
f o r ( i =32; i <48 ; i++)
R_KEY[ i+(k ∗48 ) ] = 0 ;
}
// wr i t i ng the keys
R_CMDBUF[ 0 ] = M_WRITE;
R_CMDBUF[ 1 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR1) >> 16) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 2 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR1) >> 8) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 3 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR1) >> 0) & 0xFF ) ;
f o r ( i =0; i <48 ; i++)
R_CMDBUF[ i +4] = R_KEY[ i ] ;
f o r ( i=48 ; i <64 ; i++)
R_CMDBUF[ i +4] = 0 ;
f o r ( i =48; i <96 ; i++)
R_CMDBUF[ i +20] = R_KEY[ i ] ;
f o r ( i =112 ; i <128 ; i++)
R_CMDBUF[ i +4] = 0 ;
send_to_FLASH(R_CMDBUF, 1 3 2 ) ;
read_from_FLASH(R_DATABUF, 1 3 2 ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 0 ] = M_WRITE;
R_CMDBUF[ 1 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR1) >> 16) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 2 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR1) >> 8) & 0xFF ) ;
R_CMDBUF[ 3 ] = ( unsigned char ) ( ( (ID_ADDR_PTR1) >> 0) & 0xFF ) ;
f o r ( i =0; i <48 ; i++)
R_CMDBUF[ i +4] = R_KEY[ i +96] ;
f o r ( i=48 ; i <64 ; i++)
R_CMDBUF[ i +4] = 0 ;
f o r ( i =48; i <96 ; i++)
R_CMDBUF[ i +20] = R_KEY[ i +96] ;
f o r ( i =112 ; i <128 ; i++)
R_CMDBUF[ i +4] = 0 ;
send_to_FLASH(R_CMDBUF, 1 3 2 ) ;
read_from_FLASH(R_DATABUF, 1 3 2 ) ;
}
